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PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
KEVIN

C.

WALSH*

Courts often hold legislation unconstitutional, but nearly always only part of the
statute offends. The problem of partial unconstitutionality is therefore pervasive
and persistent. Yet the exclusive doctrinal tool for dealing with this problem-severability doctrine-is deeply flawed. To make matters worse, severability doctrine is
purportedly necessary for any workable system of judicial review. The accepted
view is that severance saves: A court faced with a partially unconstitutional law
must sever and excise the unconstitutional provisions or applications so that the
constitutional remainder can be enforced going forward. Absent severance and
excision, a law must fall in its entirety. This excision-based understanding of judicial review is supposedly traceable to Marbury v. Madison. In fact, this attribution
is anachronistic. Moreover, the prevailing view is wrong about the distinctive function of modern severability doctrine, which is not to save, but to destroy. This
Article retrieves the original approach to partial unconstitutionality and develops a
proposal for implementing a version of that approach. The proposal, displacement
without inferred fallback law, is simultaneously ambitious and modest. It is ambitious because it proposes a shift in the general framework for judicial review in
every case; it is modest because the proposed shift would change case outcomes in
only a small set of highly consequential cases.
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INTRODUCTION

Many laws are unconstitutional, but few are entirely so. As a
result, partial unconstitutionality is pervasive. Sometimes a statute's
unconstitutionality resides in a discrete textual provision, such as a
legislative veto in a complex immigration statute1 or a private cause of
action for gender-motivated violence in a massive crime bill.2 More
commonly, a statute's unconstitutionality inheres in some applications
of the statute but not others, such as a speech restriction that is unconstitutional as applied to speech on public sidewalks but not elsewhere,3 or heightened protection for religious liberty that is
unconstitutional as applied to states and localities but constitutional as
applied to the federal government. 4 Although often unnoticed, almost
every instance of judicial review presents an issue of partial unconstitutionality in one form or another.
The problem of what to do with partially unconstitutional laws
has a long pedigree. Marbury v. Madison, for instance, resulted in a
holding of partial unconstitutionality. 5 The Court held unconstitutional just one part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Section 13) and just
some applications of that part (Supreme Court issuance of writs of
mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction). 6 Chief Justice
Marshall's reasoning in Marbury continues to frame the problem of
partial unconstitutionality today. Following Marshall's reasoning, the
question asked by a court engaged in judicial review is whether the act
1 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983) (invalidating Immigration and
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 244(b), (c), 66 Stat. 163, 216 (1952)).
2 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302(c), 108 Stat. 1796, 1941).
3 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (invalidating in part Act of
August 18, 1949, Pub. L. No. 250, § 6, 63 Stat. 616, 617 as applied to public sidewalks
surrounding Supreme Court building).
4 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-36 (1997) (invalidating in part
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat.
1488, 1489 as applied to state and local governments).
5 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137, 176-80 (1803) (holding that portion of Judiciary Act of 1789
allowing Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus to public officers" conflicts with
Constitution and is therefore void).
6 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As·Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARV. L. REv. 1321, 1337 n.91 (2000) ("[T]he Court did not invalidate that linguistic
unit of the [Judiciary Act of 1789] insofar as it authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs
of mandamus in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.").
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of the legislature is "void." 7 A holding of unconstitutionality is, therefore, a holding of voidness. If a legislative act is void, how can any
portion of it be enforced after a judicial pronouncement of
unconstitutionality?
Current law and scholarship answer that severability doctrine is
the exclusive way to deal with partial unconstitutionality. Severability
doctrine governs whether a court may first separate out or "sever" the
unconstitutional provisions or applications of a law, and then subtract
or "excise" them, so the constitutional remainder can be enforced
going forward. Thus conceived, this judicial operation creates a new
law that consists of the old law "minus" its unconstitutional provisions
or applications.s
The lodestar for this severability determination is legislative
intent. Because a court must not "use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature," 9 the court must ask before severing:
"Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no
statute at all?" 10 If the answer is "no," then the court should not sever
but instead should declare the statute entirely invalid and enjoin its
enforcement in all applications.
As the doctrinal formula for determining severability reveals, the
required inquiry into legislative intent is unlike many other interpretive inquiries, in that it asks what the legislature would have done, not
what the legislature actually did. 11 Thus, the doctrine leaves courts
with significant discretion in deciding whether and how to sever and
excise statutes. Legislatures that enact partially unconstitutional laws
may not foresee their constitutional flaws and may not articulate a
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 CoLUM. L. REv. 303, 305 (2007) ("[A] severability clause ... provides that in the event that the original Jaw is held partly invalid, a
fallback of the original Jaw minus the invalid provision or application will take effect."); see
also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633, 674-75 (2006) ("[T]he normal presumption of constitutional Jaw is that statutes are 'severable' (or, synonymously, 'separable'): Even if a statute has unconstitutional components or would be unconstitutional as
applied to particular facts, the unconstitutional elements or applications can be severed
from the valid ones and the valid ones enforced.").
9 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (quoting
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979)).
10 Id. Additionally, the Court assumes that "Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance
of the legislation is incapable of functioning independently." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock,
480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
11 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (stating that severability
depends on "what 'Congress would have intended' in light of the Court's constitutional
holding") (citation omitted).
7

8
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preference about how to cure any constitutional flaws that they do
foresee.
Those who trust the judiciary to work things out by discerning the
legislature's unstated intent about a matter that it never addressed
when legislating can take heart from the current approach to partial
unconstitutionality. The rest of us should be concerned. The problem
is not simply that severability doctrine vests courts with substantial
discretion, but that it does so in an area of the law in which the stakes
are high.
The deployment of severability doctrine can be highly consequential because the doctrine allows a court to declare entirely invalid
a law that is only partially unconstitutional.1 2 The doctrine may also
metastasize invalidity beyond unconstitutionality even when it yields
the conclusion that particular statutory provisions are severable. For
example, in the Supreme Court's recent high-profile deployment of
the doctrine in Booker v. United States, the Court "severed and
excised" two statutory provisions-one that made the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines binding and another that governed appellate
review of federal sentencing.13 As a consequence of the Court's supposition about what the enacting Congress would have intended about
a problem that it neither anticipated nor addressed when legislating,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now nonbinding even in the
thousands upon thousands of cases in which binding Guidelines pose
no constitutional problem.
If severability doctrine is threatening because of the significant
discretion it vests in courts to invalidate a statute beyond just those
uses and provisions that are unconstitutional, why do we have it?
Mostly, it seems, because of the belief that we cannot do without it.
Seen or unseen, severability doctrine is omnipresent in judicial review
as currently understood. According to existing case law and scholarship, every holding of partial unconstitutionality that does not lead to
total invalidation necessarily rests on severability, implicitly if not
explicitly. Indeed, according to Michael Dorf, "no workable system of
judicial review could function without a large role for severability." 14

12 See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635-37 (1895) (invalidating as inseparable all income tax provisions of federal tax statute after determining that
provisions taxing income derived from real and personal property were unconstitutional).
13 Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 ("(W]e must sever and excise two specific statutory provisions: the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range ... and the provision that sets forth standards of review on appeal
.... ") (citation omitted).
14 Dorf, supra note 8, at 370.
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Operating on the assumption that severability is inevitable in one
form or another, scholars have leveled many criticisms at its doctrinal
particulars and offered proposals for reform. But nothing has
changed. Modern severability doctrine exists in much the same form
today as when it emerged in the mid-nineteenth century.
This Article changes the terms of the problem by demonstrating
that the counterfactual speculation required by modern severability
doctrine is not necessary to a workable system of judicial review.
While there must be a means of specifying the scope of invalidity
flowing from a holding of unconstitutionality, modern severability
doctrine is not the only such means.
Although the history of severability has already been written, 15
there is a notable gap in doctrinal history: There exists no sustained
scholarly treatment of judicial responses to partially unconstitutional
statutes prior to the emergence of legislative intent-based severability
analysis in the 1850s. This Article begins to fill that gap by recovering
the operative approach to partial unconstitutionality in the first several decades of judicial review following Marbury. The evidence that
emerges disproves the prevailing notion that judicial review without
modern severability doctrine is unworkable. That widely accepted
notion rests on an anachronistic attribution of modern severability
doctrine to Chief Justice Marshall, his immediate successors on the
federal bench, and their state-court contemporaries. Whatever else
may be said about the first several decades of post-Marbury judicial
review in the United States, it was workable. And it worked without
modern hypothetical-intent-based severability doctrine.
Judicial review can work that way again today. Most fundamentally, it is necessary to change the foundational metaphor that structures thinking about judicial review-a change from excision to
displacement. The familiar excision-based approach to judicial review
implies that a court has the power to eliminate unconstitutional provisions by a process of subtraction. In contrast, under a displacementbased approach, a court does not excise anything from a statute but
instead determines the extent to which superior law displaces inferior
law in resolving the particular case before it.
15 See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REv. 41,
66-73 (1995) (discussing inlproper importation of contract law concepts into statutory severability analysis); John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203, 210-25 (1993)
(tracing development of Supreme Court jurisprudence on severability doctrine); Michael
D. Shumsky, Severability, lnseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227,
240-43 (2004) (describing Supreme Court's reassertion of severability doctrine in historical
context of New Deal); Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the
Supreme Coun, 51 HARV. L. REv. 76, 79-82 (1937) (surveying history and evolution of
severability doctrine).
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After changing the foundational metaphor, a question remains
about the scope of displacement. First principles dictate that superior
law can displace no less of the inferior law than is repugnant to it, but
what about more? The proposed approach instructs courts not to infer
invalidity beyond unconstitutionality. The goal is for the enforceable
law resulting from an exercise of judicial re'view to be traceable to a
combination of constitutional command and legislative provision,
rather than judicial supposition about what the legislature would have
wanted.
For too long, judicial rewriting through severability doctrine has
been accepted as inevitable. This perceived inevitability has kept the
debate centered on how courts should rewrite statutes, bypassing
entirely the antecedent question of whether they should do so.
This Article proposes a restoration of review without rewriting. It
proceeds in three parts. Part I explicates existing doctrine and its
flaws. Part II explains how courts in the United States dealt with partially unconstitutional statutes before the emergence of legislative
intent-based severability doctrine in the 1850s. Part III expounds a
reconstructed version of the earlier approach to partial unconstitutionality that can be implemented in constitutional adjudication in
present times.
I
EXCISION

This Part lays the groundwork for the historical analysis in Part II
and the doctrinal reconstruction in Part III. This Part first describes
the function of severability doctrine in existing law and its fit in the
prevailing excision-based approach to judicial review. It then explores
the problems with severability doctrine and the approach to judicial
review in which it is embedded.
A.

The Nature of Severability Doctrine

Severability doctrine governs the decision whether to sever a partially unconstitutional statute. It is one tool for implementing the
Supreme Court's general approach to constitutional remedies: to "try
to limit the solution to the problem." 16 When the constitutional
problem does not inhere in all of a statute's applications or provisions,
a reviewing court should, if otherwise appropriate, "enjoin only the
unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force, or ... sever its problematic portions while leaving the
16

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006).
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remainder intact." 17 These forms of less-than-total invalidation are
typically (if awkwardly) referred to as "application severability" and
"text severability" respectively. 18
Severability doctrine sets legislative intent as a constraint on
when courts can "limit the solution to the problem." 19 If the legislature would not have enacted the unconstitutional law without its
unconstitutional provisions or applications, the doctrine calls for
courts to invalidate the legislation in its entirety. 20 The phrasing of the
doctrinal test and the inherently counterfactual nature of the problem
reveal that the required inquiry into legislative intent is unlike interpretive inquiries that aim to uncover what the legislature actually provided for in its legislation. Severability doctrine asks what the
legislature would have done, not what the legislature actually did. 21
A legislature may try to control the severability determination by
expressing its intent in a severability or inseverability clause. 22
Although one might expect that such a clause unambiguously conveying legislative intent would be dispositive, severability doctrine
provides that such clauses are neither necessary nor sufficient to control the judicial determination of severability. 23 Under federal law,
"the inclusion of [a severability] clause creates a presumption that
Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to

Id. (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 CoLUM. L. REv.
873, 885 & n.52 (2005) (distinguishing "application severability" from "text severability"
and identifying sources that discuss them); Adrian Vermuele, Saving Constructions, 85
GEo. L.J. 1945, 1950 n.26 (1997) ("[S)everability problems arise not only with respect to
different sections, clauses or provisions of a statute, but also with respect to applications of
a particular statutory provision when some (but not all) of those applications are
unconstitutional.").
19 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 249 (2005) (opting not to engraft
constitutional requirements onto existing sentencing scheme on ground that Congress
would have preferred total invalidation).
21 Id. at 257-58.
22 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 454 (2006) ("If any provision of this Act, or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the
Act and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.").
23 See, e.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 {1924) (describing severability clause
as "[an] aid in determining [legislative] intent ... not an inexorable command"); Shumsky,
supra note 15, at 230 ("Despite the unambiguous command of severability and inseverability clauses, the Court has repeatedly held that they create only a rebuttable presumption that guides-but does not control-a reviewing court's severability determination.").
For a general discussion of inseverability clauses, see Israel E. Friedman, Note,
Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 907-09 (1997).
17

18
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depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision," but
it does not dictate the outcome. 24
Because severability depends on legislative intent, "questions
about the meaning and thus the separability of state statutes are primarily questions of state law," while "[t]he separability of a federal
statute is ... a purely federal issue." 25 Because the precise nature of
the severability analysis to be performed depends on the type of law
being analyzed (i.e., federal or state law), doctrinal reform of severability doctrine cannot be performed in one fell swoop-the federal
system and each state system must be addressed individually. Yet it is
still reasonable to generalize about severability doctrine using federal
law and to propose a solution for implementation in the federal and
state systems alike because state doctrinal systems closely approximate federal doctrine. 26
B.

The Excision-Based Approach to Judicial Review

Severability doctrine is currently nestled within an excision-based
approach to judicial review. Within this approach, severability is the
exclusive doctrinal tool for dealing with the problem of partial unconstitutionality. But while partial unconstitutionality is ubiquitous,
explicit discussions of severability are not. Courts and scholars explain
the absence of explicit severability reasoning from cases involving partial unconstitutionality by attributing implicit severability analysis to
those decisions. 27 These attributions of implicit severability rest on an
excision-based understanding of judicial review.
According to this understanding, a court facing a partially unconstitutional statute proceeds in two steps. First, the court must determine whether it is possible to "sever" the unconstitutional parts from
the constitutional parts. Second, the court must "excise" any unconstitutional parts that are severable, so that the constitutional remainder
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987).
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 182-83 (5th ed. 2003).
26 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 235, 285 (1994) (noting that federal and state severability doctrines are "remarkably
uniform" in practice).
27 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 320-32 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(describing cases in which Supreme Court "disposes of as-applied challenges to a statute by
simply invalidating particular applications of the statute, without saying anything at all
about severability"); United States v. Nat'! Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 488
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing precedents that
held certain statutory applications unconstitutional as "having involved implied severability"); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 184 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (describing judgment of partial unconstitutionality as "excising"
unconstitutional applications from challenged statute).
24

25
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can be enforced going forward. 28 If severance and excision are appropriate, the result is conceptualized as a new statute that consists of the
old statute "minus" its unconstitutional parts. 29
Scholars use this theory of excision-based severability doctrine to
explain not only every instance of partial invalidation, but also every
instance of as-applied adjudication, whether or not it leads to invalidation. A paradigm case is Yazoo & Mississippi Railroad v. Jackson
Vinegar Co. ,30 in which the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a
Mississippi statute requiring prompt settlement of certain low-dollarvalue claims for lost or damaged goods. 31 The Court responded to the
railroad's constitutional challenge that the statute improperly required
settlement of even false or frivolous claims by declining to adjudicate
the constitutionality of the statute itself or even as applied to other
cases. 32 The Court instead considered the statute only as applied to
the particular claim at issue in the case at hand: The railroad counsel's
concession that the underlying claim for a damaged shipment of vinegar bottles was neither false nor frivolous disposed of the case. 33 Said
the Court: "It suffices . . . to hold that, as applied to cases like the
present, the statute is valid. " 34
Richard Fallon argues that the Court's refusal in Yazoo to consider the railroad's "facial" challenge is based on "an implicit assumption that statutory rules are reducible to what might be characterized
as statutory 'sub-rules.' "35 That is, the rule "settle all claims" can be
divided into the subrules (i) "settle all valid and non-exorbitant
claims," and (ii) "settle all frivolous and excessive claims.'' 36 With
28 See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 258 ("We now turn to the question of which portions of
the sentencing statute we must sever and excise as inconsistent with the Court's constitutional requirement.").
29 See Dorf, supra note 26, at 238 ("[A] statute that has unconstitutional applications
cannot be constitutionally applied to anyone, even to those whose conduct is not constitutionally privileged, unless the court can sever the unconstitutional applications of the
statute from the constitutionally permitted ones."); Metzger, supra note 18, at 887-88 ("If
unconstitutional applications are not severed, the statute cannot be applied to any litigant,
even one making no claim of constitutional protection for her conduct. On the other hand,
if unconstitutional applications of a statute can be severed, refusing to apply the statute to
conduct that is not constitutionally protected becomes unjustified.").
30 226 U.S. 217 (1912).
31 Id. at 218-20.
32 Id. at 219-20.
33 Id. at 219.
34 Id. at 219-20.
35 FALLON ET AL., supra note 25, at 182. According to Fallon, the question in a case like
Yazoo is "whether a statutory provision that does not on its face reflect divisible linguistic
units-such as a requirement that railroads must settle 'all claims'-can nonetheless be
severed into valid and invalid elements." Id.
36 Id.
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judicial review understood to be focused on the constitutional validity
of subrules, severability doctrine enables as-applied adjudication by
providing the mechanism for subrule (i) to survive even if subrule (ii)
is invalid. 37
The reason to attribute implicit severance to as-applied adjudication is to reconcile the practice "with what Henry Monaghan has
termed the 'valid rule requirement'-the notion that everyone has a
personal constitutional right not to be subjected to governmental
sanctions except pursuant to a constitutionally valid rule of law." 38
Michael Dorf explains the logic of this reconciliation, attributing to
the Yazoo Court the implicit reasoning that "if the statute has unconstitutional applications, they are severable from the constitutional
applications. "39
"Excision" is, of course, only a metaphor. There is no judicial
Exacto knife that courts use to excise words from the statute books.
When a court holds part of a statute unconstitutional, it issues a judgment saying so (and, in some cases, an injunction against its future
enforcement). By virtue of precedent and preclusion, this judgment
and the reasoning in support of it prevent the unconstitutional part of
the statute from having legal effect going forward. 40 Nothing about
the actual text of the statute changes as a direct consequence of judicial action.
When a judgment and its supporting reasoning prevent the
unconstitutional parts of a statute from having legal effect in all circumstances, it is as if the unconstitutional parts no longer existed, as if
the court had excised the unconstitutional parts. But, again, this is just
a manner of speaking. Because the court does not do anything to the
statute itself, the statute persists as law that can spring back into effect
if the constitutional barrier to its enforcement is somehow removed. If
constitutional doctrine changes, then no further legislative action is
37 See id. ("If the statute is viewed as comprising a number of sub-rules, it becomes
comprehensible that sub-rule (i) could survive even if sub-rule (ii) were constitutionally
invalid and had to be severed.").
38 Fallon, supra note 6, at 1331 (internal citation omitted).
39 Dorf, supra note 26, at 249. This attribution is necessary to reconcile the Court's
conclusion with the possibility that the statute had unconstitutional applications because,
"[i]f the statute requiring railroads to settle all claims promptly is an unconstitutional exercise of the state's authority, then, one would suppose, no railroad should be judged by it,
even if the railroad's conduct merits no constitutional protection." Id. at 243.
40 See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1339 ("A court has no power to remove a law from the
statute books. When a court rules that a statute is invalid-whether as applied, in part, or
on its face-the legal force of its decision resides in doctrines of claim and issue preclusion
and of precedent."); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74
Nw. U. L. REv. 759, 767 (1979) ("No matter what language is used in a judicial opinion, a
federal court cannot repeal a duly enacted statute of any legislative authority.").
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necessary for "excised" portions of the statute to regain their legal
effect.41
Although excision is only a metaphor, it is a powerful one that
underwrites the perceived need for severability doctrine. Michael
Dorf attempts to establish the central role of severability doctrine to
constitutional adjudication by demonstrating the unworkability of a
general rule of nonseverability. 42 If courts were to apply a rule of nonseverability, Dorf asks, "[W]ould the invalidation of some snippet of
text imply the invalidation of everything else that was enacted as part
of the same omnibus bill as that snippet? Would it imply the invalidation of the provision in which the snippet was embedded at the time of
the challenge?" 4 3 Indeed, Dorf presses, "[w]hy just the provision
rather than the Code section, the Code title, or the entire U.S. Code
itself?" 44 Dorf concludes that "[b ]ecause the more extreme of these
options are plainly implausible, courts never face a choice of whether
to sever invalid provisions or applications from valid ones, but instead
must always decide how much to sever." 45 The argument, in essence,
is that severability is inevitable because nonseverability is unworkable.
In sum, severability doctrine is viewed as the exclusive tool for
dealing with partial unconstitutionality under the prevailing excisionbased understanding of judicial review. According to this understanding, "a statute that has unconstitutional applications cannot be
constitutionally applied to anyone, even to those whose conduct is not
constitutionally privileged, unless the court can sever the unconstitutional applications of the statute from the constitutionally permitted
ones." 46 Moreover, the argument goes, every occasion of invalidation
results in judicial lawmaking through subtraction, and it has been this
way since Marbury. 47 In this excision-based view, severance is salvific:
It saves the constitutional remainder of an unconstitutional law by
41 It may, however, be necessary for a party to prior litigation holding the statute
unconstitutional to seek modification of an injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b). FED. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(5); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239-40 (1997) (authorizing relief from
permanent injunction limiting local educational officials' use of federal funds based on
significant changes in Establishment Clause doctrine).
42 Dorf, supra note 8, at 370.
43

44

45

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also id. ("(Without severability,] any judicial decision finding any Jaw uncon-

stitutional, on its face or as applied, would call into question the entire legal code.").
46 Dorf, supra note 26, at 238.
47 See id. at 250 (describing Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury as applying "the same
presumption of severability" as in Yazoo); cf Fallon, supra note 6, at 1337 n.91 ("Marbury
provides an especially nice illustration of the extent to which constitutional practice presupposes that statutory rules-understood as linguistic units-can and should be treated as
comprising severable subrules.").
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treating the unconstitutional portion "as if it were a distinct unconstitutional provision."48
The excision-based understanding of judicial review provides a
powerful, internally coherent account of constitutional adjudication in
the United States. This understanding does have one descriptive
weakness: It requires attribution of implicit severance on a massive
scale. But this weakness is minor-such attribution does not contradict anything the Court has done and is consistent with the understanding of at least some Justices. 49
The principal problem with excision is not descriptive but prescriptive: Excision requires deployment of a destructive doctrine that
is subject to manipulation because of the counterfactual speculation
that it requires.
C.

Problems with Severability and Excision

Despite its potency, severability doctrine often evades scrutiny by
remaining in the shadows of the substantive constitutional rulings that
occasion its application. Those who have trained their lights on the
doctrine, however, have been almost uniformly critical of what they
have seen.
Robert Stern wrote the seminal article on severability in 1937.50
Frustrated by the Supreme Court's complete invalidation of partially
unconstitutional New Deal economic legislation, Stern sought to bring
order to a doctrine that he diagnosed as riddled with contradiction. 51
Yet Stern could find no organizing principles behind the doctrine, and
he concluded that the Court's severability reasoning simply rationalized results reached on other grounds (such as preferred outcomes). 52
This criticism has never satisfactorily been answered. But as the Court
showed greater receptivity to New Deal legislation as a matter of substantive constitutional law, the pressure on severability doctrine
abated. 53
Dorf, supra note 26, at 250.
See supra note 27.
50 Stem, supra note 15.
51 Id. at 78 ("Only if the apparent inconsistencies in Supreme Court decisions [dealing
with the severability of statutes] are exposed and explained, as they have not been by the
Court itself, can a conscious effort be made to formulate understandable and sensible principles for the future.").
52 Id. at 101-02 ("[T]he Court avails itself of one [severability] formula or another in
order to justify results which seem to it to be desirable for other reasons.").
53 See Shumsky, supra note 15, at 240 ("Since 1936, ... severability questions seem to
have mostly faded into the background-perhaps as a consequence of the Court's willingness to accept the constitutionality of most New Deal-style regulatory legislation.").
48
49
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While the shift in substantive law diverted scholarly attention to
other matters, the doctrine stayed the same for the next several
decades, warts and all. Evaluating severability doctrine in the rnid1990s, Mark Movsesian observed:
[Severability doctrine] has drawn criticism on almost every conceivable basis. Commentators have condemned [it] as too malleable and
as too rigid; as encouraging judicial overreaching and as encouraging judicial abdication. They have criticized the doctrine's
reliance on legislative intent and its disregard of legislative intent;
its excessive attention to political concerns and its inattention to
political concerns ....5 4

Though these criticisms obviously reflect differing evaluations, they
share the common characteristic of dissatisfaction with existing severability doctrine. Recent scholarship has continued in this same critical
vein. 55
The most recent spur to critical evaluation of severability doctrine
is the Court's audacious use of that doctrine in United States v.
Booker. 56 Justice Breyer's remedial opinion for the Court used severability doctrine to render the Federal Sentencing Guidelines nonmandatory by "severing" and "excising" two statutory provisions from
the Sentencing Act.5 7 The effect was to make the Guidelines advisory
in all federal sentencing even though mandatory Guidelines would be
Movsesian, supra note 15, at 41-42 (internal citations omitted).
See, e.g., David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 639, 663 (2008) ("[Severability doctrine] gives courts extensive power to rewrite statutes ... in a way that makes after-the-fact legislative correction unlikely[,] ... warps legislatures' incentives to obey constitutional norms ex ante[,) [and) allows courts to make
vague law without thinking about it."); Nagle, supra note 15, at 225 ("The confusion surrounding presumptions and the absence of a consistent effort to explain how severability
fits within broader theories of judicial review and statutory construction has left all of the
various tests used over the years unanchored by a principled approach."); Emily L.
Sherwin, Rules and Judicial Review, in 6 LEGAL THEORY 299, 308 (2000) (arguing that
existing doctrine inadequately accounts for "the effect of severance and related practices in
establishing new rules, and the relative competence of courts and legislatures to perform
the rulemaking function").
56 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
57 Id. Justice Breyer first inquired whether Congress would have preferred federal
sentencing with the Sixth Amendment jury requirement engrafted onto the current system,
or instead would have preferred no determinate sentencing scheme at all. Id. at 249. He
concluded that "Congress would likely have preferred the total invalidation of the Act to
an Act with the Court's Sixth Amendment requirement engrafted onto it." Id. Next, he
asked whether some remedy short of complete invalidation would both solve the constitutional problem and also be consistent with legislative intent, concluding that "Congress
would likely have preferred the excision of some of the Act, namely the Act's mandatory
language, to the invalidation of the entire Act." Id. The Court accordingly "sever[ed] and
excise[d]" the provision that made the Guidelines mandatory, along with intertwined provisions relating to appeal. Id. at 259.
54
55
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unconstitutional in only some federal sentencing. 58 The Booker
remedy is a form of statutory cy pres-the judicial crafting of a new
sentencing scheme that conforms as far as possible to hypothetical legislative intent in light of the constitutional barrier to the implementation of the sentencing scheme that Congress actually enacted. As the
Court must have recognized, and as the cases following Booker have
borne out, the Booker remedy committed the federal judiciary to
working out in a common law-like fashion the operational details of
the new advisory Guidelines scheme wrought by the Court's severance and excision.
Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court denied the dissenters'
charges that it had created a new kind of severance analysis. 59 In a
thorough analysis of the Booker remedy, Gillian Metzger similarly
explains that, although "reasonable minds can[ ] and do[ ] differ"
about whether "Congress would have preferred invalidation of [only]
the Act's mandatory provisions to its total invalidation," these differences speak only to this specific application of severability doctrine,
not to the legitimacy of using severability doctrine in general. 60
Metzger concludes that, "accepting arguendo the majority's reading of
the Sentencing Act, its remedial approach of facial invalidation was
perfectly legitimate."61
Evaluated through this lens, the Booker remedy reveals how
modern severability doctrine provides for a form of "backdoor" facial
invalidation that depends not on constitutional command but on judicially perceived counterfactual legislative intent. When a court uses
application inseverability to invalidate all applications of a provision
that is only unconstitutional in some applications, the effect is
equivalent to a blanket "excision" of text that is only sometimes
unconstitutional. And barring either a change in the underlying constitutional rule or new legislation, the result is that the sometimes
unconstitutional text may never be judicially enforced.
58 Id. at 266-67. The remedy of making the Guidelines advisory in all federal sentencing was not argued for by any party or amicus curiae.
59 Compare id. at 247 (majority opinion), with id. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The
precedent on which the Court relies is scant indeed."), and id. at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's remedial application of severability "constitute[s] legislation beyond [the Court's] judicial power").
60 Metzger, supra note 18, at 892 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 248). Metzger grounds
her defense of the Booker remedy in the principle of "application severability," arguing
that "if a provision's unconstitutional applications cannot be severed or construed away,
then ... [the] provision cannot be constitutionally applied at all .... " Id. at 892. According
to Metzger, "application inseverability" supplies the source of judicial authority to invalidate a statutory provision that is not facially unconstitutional. Id.

61

Id.
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This analysis of the Booker remedy also illustrates just how much
lawmaking authority severability doctrine grants to a court. By
reaching determinations about counterfactual legislative intent
regarding a combination of applications and provisions, a court
reviewing a partially unconstitutional statute can expand the scope of
its invalidation as widely or as narrowly as it discerns to be consistent
with hypothesized legislative intent. This authority to "excise" and
"rewrite" is effectively discretionary because the legislative intent test
is almost always indeterminate. The Court claims to discern what
Congress would have intended had Congress known that its actual legislation was unconstitutional as written. In Booker, the Court's conclusion regarding "what Congress would have intended in light of the
Court's constitutional holding" 62 looked very much like what the
Court would have legislated had it possessed the authority to make
sentencing policy as a legislator.
It should come as no surprise that the Court's conclusion in
Booker about what Congress would have wanted lines up closely with
what five Justices think Congress should have wanted. And it is
impossible to assail the outcome with evidence of what the enacting
Congress did want because that Congress expressed no actual legislative intent regarding mandatory sentencing under the Apprendil
Blakely line of cases.63
This is not an isolated problem. Severability doctrine requires
focus on hypothetical intent because there often is no actual,
Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (internal quotations omitted).
Determinate federal sentencing based on binding guidelines promulgated by the
United States Sentencing Commission resulted from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1989) {describing revisions to federal
sentencing in 1984 Act). The Fifth and Sixth Amendment limitations on judicial factfinding
that doomed the Guidelines in Booker began to emerge in the mid-to-late 1990s. See Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 {1999) (arguing that under Fifth and Sixth
Amendment limitations, "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt"); Douglas A. Berman, Examining the Blakely
Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 307, 307 (2004) ("[T]he constitutional ground under sentencing reform had been rumbling for some time before the
Blakely earthquake hit."). These limitations were given serious bite in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in which the Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey hatecrime statute that provided for a sentencing enhancement based on judicial factfinding.
But it was not until Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), that the principle underlying Apprendi was understood as a direct threat to the federal guidelines system. See
Berman, supra, at 308 (explaining that Court's holding in Blakely came as surprise because
"most observers believed [Blakely] was to serve as final confirmation that the Apprendi
decision would not radically transform modern sentencing practices"). There is no way that
the Congress that created the Guidelines system two decades earlier could have formed an
intent about how the system should operate in light of the constitutional requirements
identified in Blakely.
62

63
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expressed legislative intent to be found. 64 The hypothetical legislative
intent test gets around this absence of any actual legislative intent to
discern but does so by posing a question whose answer often calls for
rank speculation. 65 The inquiry "can perhaps be given some content
by reference to legislative purpose, or to the 'enterprise' to which the
statute belongs. But it can easily deteriorate into a question of what
ought to happen, in which case 'legislative intent' adds nothing." 66
There is another problem. Suppose the hypothetical legislative
intent approach yields an as-close-as-you-can-get-to-determinative
conclusion that the legislature would not have enacted the legislation
without its unconstitutional parts. Severability doctrine would then
require total invalidation, even if the reason the legislature would not
have enacted the legislation has nothing to do with either the constitutional values or legitimate legislative objectives at issue. Suppose, for
example, that swing votes for an important piece of reform legislation
are bought through appropriations to a few legislators' states. Suppose, further, that the appropriations are enacted as part of the same
omnibus bill but are otherwise unrelated to the subject matter of the
reform. If those appropriations are later held unconstitutional, and the
legislature would not have enacted the statute without those votebuying payoffs, severability doctrine would require invalidation of the
reform legislation.
A concrete illustration of this potential problem can be found in
the path through the federal courts followed by the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act ("BCRA"). In 2003, the BCRA survived a facial challenge in McConnell v. FEC. 67 Five years later, the
Court held that a BCRA provision whose constitutionality the Court
did not adjudicate in McConnell-the so-called "Millionaires'
64 As Emily Sherwin has observed, "severability questions are triggered by unplanned
statutory failures." Sherwin, supra note 55, at 304; see also Stem, supra note 15, at 98
("Difficult problems of statutory construction generally arise because the legislature has
not thought of the particular situation which has come before the Court, and accordingly
had no real intention as to how the law should be construed with respect to it."). The
generalization about unplanned statutory failures does not always hold true, particularly
with respect to legislation in fertile areas of constitutional litigation. But it holds often
enough to assign the absence of forethought as one reason for the absence of actual intent.
65 See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 55, at 305 ("The difficulty here is that hypothetical
intent is quite speculative.").
66 Id. These criticisms are aimed not at the consideration of legislative intent in general,
but at the counterfactual speculation required by modem severability doctrine in
particular.
67 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding against facial First Amendment challenge various provisions of Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (regulating soft-money contributions and
"electioneering communications")).
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Amendment"-violated the First Amendment. 68 Suppose it can be
shown that Congress would not have enacted the BCRA absent the
incumbency protection provided by the Millionaires' Amendment. 69 If
that supposition is correct, then the BCRA must fall in its entirety.
While totally invalidating the BCRA based on severability doctrine
after upholding it against a facial challenge might seem absurd, that is
exactly what adherence to the hypothetical legislative intent test
would require. 70 The alternative is to fight the hypothetical and dispute whether Congress would have enacted the BCRA without the
Millionaires' Amendment. But that move only returns focus to the
indeterminacy of the inquiry: Can anyone really know whether the
BCRA would have passed without the Millionaires' Amendment?
Should the continued existence of the entire legislative scheme for
federal campaign financing turn on the answer to such a question?
Would anyone be surprised if this question were asked of the Supreme
Court, and the answers tracked the Justices' personal views about the
constitutionality of the BCRA more generally? 71
Although Booker and the BCRA provide particularly vivid illustrations of the sweeping discretionary authority supplied by modem
severance doctrine, the problems discussed above are not new, and
severability doctrine has remained fundamentally unchanged since it
was introduced over a century and a half ago. There is nothing much
68 Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). The Millionaires' Amendment relaxed contribution limits for candidates running against opponents who spent significant sums of their
own money in support of their candidacy. See id. at 2765-67 (describing how "Millionaires'
Amendment" provision operated). The Court held that "imposing different contribution
and coordinated party expenditure limits on candidates vying for the same seat is antithetical to the First Amendment." Id. at 2774.
69 But see Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Davis, 554 U.S. _
(No. 07-340)
(Solicitor Gen. Paul Clement) (arguing that Millionaires' Amendment is severable, relying
in part on presence of severability clause); 34 Op. FEC 9 (2008) (concluding that personal
loan provision in BCRA was severable from unconstitutional Millionaires' Amendment).
70 A wrinkle in this argument is that some legislators who voted for the Millionaires'
Amendment may have recognized the possibility that it was unconstitutional but voted to
include it anyway in the belief that the statute's severability clause would prevent its
unconstitutionality from bringing down the rest of the statute. Of course, this additional
wrinkle just further exposes how difficult the project of discerning hypothetical legislative
intent can be.
71 Cf. Stern, supra note 15, at 113 ("(T]he judges who disapproved of the Jaw thought it
was inseparable, while those who regarded it as constitutional also took a contrary position
on the question of separability.").
The Court's recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), presents
another opportunity for speculation about the BCRA's severability. Would Congress have
enacted the legislation if it knew that it could not ban independent corporate spending on
electioneering communications? What about the ban on electioneering communications as
applied to others? Given the stakes of the answers to these questions and the indeterminacy of the inquiry, perhaps the answers will depend on who one asks.
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to do about this state of affairs if modern severability doctrine is necessary for "[any] workable system of judicial review." 72 Must we just
learn to live with it and tinker at the edges of the doctrine? If so, then
observing the doctrine's unyielding endurance to sustained criticism
would be an occasion for lamentation, but nothing more.
The truth is that modern severability doctrine is not inevitable.
We can have a functional system of judicial review without it. Indeed,
the system would function better without it. The next Part aims to
puncture the inevitability of modern severability doctrine through historical analysis. Part III then fills the conceptual space opened up by
the elimination of modern severability doctrine.
II
DocrRINAL HISTORY

This Part presents the results of research into the original
approach to partial unconstitutionality. It first identifies the conceptual foundations of the approach and then describes how the background principles for dealing with partial unconstitutionality operated
across a range of areas of substantive constitutional law. This Part
closes with a discussion of why the original approach to partial unconstitutionality has not been previously noticed.
A.

Foundations of Repugnancy Displacement

The recovery project begins with a fresh reading of Alexander
Hamilton's exposition in Federalist No. 78, which Philip Hamburger
describes as "an unusually elegant illustration of how lawyers tended
to perceive the authority of the judges to expound the law, including
the U.S. Constitution." 73 According to Hamilton, "The judiciary ...
has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no
active resolution whatever." 74 The power of the judiciary is to enter
judgments in cases. 75 In reaching judgments, courts possess the
authority "to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the
constitution . . . . " 76 This authority derives from the Constitution's
status as fundamental law and from judges' obligation "to regulate
72 Dorf, supra note 8, at 370.
73 PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DlJrY 552 (2008).
74 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
75 See id. ("It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment;
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.") (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 379.
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their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which
are not fundamental." 77
The practice that Hamilton defended in Federalist No. 78 is not
the same as the modem conception of "judicial review," in which
courts "strike down" legislation. Rather, what we now call judicial
review consisted of a refusal to give a statute effect as operative law in
resolving a case. Hamilton described the practice of refusing to
enforce an unconstitutional statute as an "exercise of judicial discretion in determining between two contradictory laws .... " 78 Because
both the Constitution and statutes are law, it belongs to the courts to
ascertain the meaning of each, and "(i]f there should happen to be an
irreconcileable variance between the two, that which has the superior
obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred . . . ."79
Hamilton recognized that two laws could be totally or only partially
contradictory,80 but he thought the same principle governed both
cases: Courts should reconcile the laws to the extent possible and,
where this cannot be done, "give effect to one, in exclusion of the
other." 81 The operative principle for Hamilton was not excision but
displacement.
According to Mary Sarah Bilder, "[w]hat contemporary scholars
and the public call 'judicial review' originally had no such name.
Indeed, until the early twentieth century, commentators identified it
descriptively as courts voiding legislation repugnant to a constitution."82 Similarly, Philip Hamburger explains that what is now called
judicial review was an implication of the nature of constitutions as law
and the judicial duty "to decide in accord with the law of the land,
including the constitution." 83
Other scholars have described American judicial review in its origins as requiring that Article III courts "refuse to enforce legislation
that violates the Constitution. "84 Much of the evidence that these
scholars rely on is also evidence of a shared presupposition that courts
Id. at 380.
Id.
79 Id. at 379-80.
BO See id. at 380 ("It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes existing at
one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other, and neither of them containing any
77
78

repealing clause or expression.") (emphasis added).
81 Id.
82

Mary Sarah Bilder, Idea or Practice: A Brief Historiography of Judicial Review, 20 J.

PoL'Y HlsT. 6, 8 (2008).

supra note 73, at 17.
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. Cttt. L.
REv. 887, 914 (emphasis added); see also id. at 916 ("[V)indicating the people's choice of a
limited Constitution requires judges to refuse to enforce unconstitutional statutes."); id. at
955 ("Throughout the United States, dozens of speakers and writers made clear that
83 HAMBURGER,
84
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could and would engage in case-by-case displacement of unconstitutional statutes. 85 The displacement takes place by virtue of a rule of
priority that requires application of superior law over inferior law to
the extent there is a conflict between the two.86
Viewed in this light, it is anachronistic to view Marbury as a case
of implicit severance and excision. It is, instead, an instance of displacement. The statutory grant of authority for the Supreme Court to
issue writs of mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction went
beyond the Article III grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court. As inferior law, the statutory grant was therefore unconstitutional to the extent that it went beyond Article III, but no further. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 was still "law" to the extent that it was not
"void." The operative concept of judicial review here was one in
which the Court, in disposing of the case before it, was obliged to
apply the superior law of the Constitution in preference to conflicting,
inferior statutory law: "If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case
to which they both apply ."87
B.

Applications

The concept of judicial review as refusal to give effect rather than
"striking down" may seem weak. But experience from the first several
decades of judicial review shows that the practice could be muscular
and effective in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution over conflicting laws. Operating within an intellectual framework in which
judicial review consisted of a refusal to give effect to inferior law that
judges, federal and state, could refuse to enforce legislation that transgressed the
Constitution.").
85 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (statement of Col. Mason) ("[I]f the Judges were joined in this check on
the laws, ... they could impede in one case only, the operation of laws. They could declare
an unconstitutional law void.") (emphasis added); BRurus XII (1788), reprinted in THE
FEDERALIST WITH LETTERS OF "BRUTUS" 506, 508 (Terence Ball ed.) ("[T]he courts are
vested with the supreme and uncontroulable power, to determine, in all cases that come
before them, what the constitution means; they cannot therefore, execute a law, which, in
their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can suppose they can make a superior
law give way to an inferior.") (emphasis added). Although most of this evidence speaks to
only the shared presupposition of case-by-case displacement of unconstitutional statutes,
there are some statements that come closer to speaking to the issue of partial unconstitutionality. For example, in congressional debates over the First Judiciary Act, Elbridge
Gerry stated that "[t)he Constitution will undoubtedly be [the courts') first rule; and so far
as your laws conform to that, they will attend to them, but no further." 1 ANNALS OF
CoNG. 829 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphases added).
86 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
87 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (emphasis added).
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was repugnant to superior law, federal and state courts were able to
vindicate the Contracts Clause,88 the Commerce Clause,89 and the
Import-Export Clause, 90 among other provisions, without massive displacement of partially unconstitutional state laws.

1.

"Not the Terms of the Law But the Effect"

Some of the clearest examples of the original approach to partial
unconstitutionality appear in cases invalidating state legislation under
the Contracts Clause. 91 The doctrinal test applied in these cases often
yielded application-specific holdings of unconstitutionality. These
holdings operated in combination with the background principle that
a statute may be void in part and valid in part to preserve challenged
statutes except insofar as their application would be unconstitutional.
That is, invalidity did not extend beyond unconstitutionality, and
unconstitutionality was confined to a specific application or set of
applications. The output of adjudication was not about the constitutional validity of a statute in the abstract, but rather about the
statute's constitutionality with respect to a particular application or
class of applications.
Golden v. Prince, an 1814 opinion by Justice Bushrod Washington
riding circuit, is illustrative. 92 A debtor invoked a Pennsylvania statute
as discharging his debts in defense to suit for payment on a bill of
exchange. The creditor responded that the statute was doubly unconstitutional, first because the power to make bankruptcy laws was
exclusively federal, and second because the state law impaired the
obligation of contracts in violation of the Contracts Clause. 93 Justice
Washington ruled for the creditor on both grounds and, in so doing,
explicitly differentiated the scope of the resulting statutory invalidity
for each holding.94
Close attention to the reasoning in this opinion provides three
important insights into the operative understanding of partial unconstitutionality. First, the function of judicial review was to determine
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts .... ").
89 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
....").
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing [its] inspection Laws .... ").
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
92 10 F. Cas. 542 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 547.
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whether to recognize the challenged law as operative law in the case
before the court. Justice Washington described the constitutional analysis as examining "whether the law relied upon by the defendant, to
bar the present action, is repugnant to the constitution of the United
States; and, on that account, is not to be regarded by the court, in this
case[.]" 95
Second, statutory law could be unconstitutional on some occasions but not others. This feature of Justice Washington's approach
can be seen in the premise with which he began his Contracts Clause
analysis: "[A] law may be unconstitutional, and of course void, in relation to particular cases; and yet valid to all intents and purposes, in its
application to other cases within the scope of its provisions, but
varying from the other in particular circumstances. " 9 6 For instance, a
debtor discharge statute is unconstitutional as applied to contracts
entered into before the statute's enactment but not as applied to contracts entered into after the statute's enactment. 97
Third, some constitutional defects can render a statute unconstitutional in all circumstances. For instance, if the power to enact bankruptcy laws is exclusively federal, and the state law is an exercise of
that power, then the state law is unconstitutional in all applications. 98
With these principles framing his analysis, Washington first found
the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional as applied to the discharge
of Prince's debt on the bill of exchange entered into prior to the law's
passage. 99 Next, Washington found the statute's bankruptcy legislation
fully unconstitutional because the power to make bankruptcy laws was
exclusively federal.1 00 The scope of statutory invalidity flowing from
each flaw differed based on the scope of the invalidating principle of
constitutional doctrine: "We are, upon the whole, of opinion, that the
law under which the certificate is pleaded, in bar of the action, is
altogether unconstitutional, for the reason last mentioned [i.e., that the
Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
Id.
97 Id. According to Washington, "a law prospective in its operation, under which a
contract afterwards made, may be avoided in a way different from that provided by the
parties, would be clearly constitutional." Id. By contrast, "if the law act retrospectively, as
to other contracts, so as to impair their obligation, the law is invalid; or in milder terms, it
affords no rule of decision in these latter cases." Id.
98 Id. at 545-47.
99 Id. at 544 ("The question then is, whether a law of a state, which declares that a
debtor, by delivering up his estate for the benefit of his creditors, shall be for ever discharged from the payment of his debts, due or contracted before the passage of the law ...
can be set up to bar the right of such creditor to recover his debt, either in a federal or state
court? ... [I]t cannot; because the law is ... one which, in the case supposed, impairs the
obligation of a contract.").
100 Id. at 545-47.
95

96
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power to enact bankruptcy legislation is exclusively federal]; and is so
in reference to this debt, for the first reason [i.e., because it impaired
the obligation of contracts]." 101
The Supreme Court confirmed Justice Washington's approach to
partial unconstitutionality when it held in Sturges v. Crowninshield
that the federal power to make uniform bankruptcy laws did not prevent states from enacting their own debtor discharge laws in the
absence of a conflicting federal bankruptcy statute. 102 Notwithstanding this holding recognizing state power, the Court held the law
in Sturges unconstitutional with respect to the particular debt at
issue. 103 The Court could not apply the statute to the debt at issue
because that debt had been contracted for before the discharge statute
was enacted. 104
The idea that a statute can be unconstitutional with respect to a
particular debt or class of debts, but otherwise valid, rested on the
application of a doctrinal test that looked to statutory effects rather
than statutory language. The opinions of Justices Trimble,
Washington, and Thompson in the Supreme Court's fractured 4-3
decision in Ogden v. Saunders reveal how this is so. 105 The analysis in
Justice Trimble's opinion 106-his only signed opinion in a constitu101 Id. at 547.
17 U.S. 122, 208 (1819).
103 Id. ("[The Act], so far as it attempts to discharge this defendant from the debt in the
declaration mentioned, is contrary to the constitution of the United States, and ... the plea
is no bar to the action.") (emphasis added). The Court's certificate sending the case back
down to the lower court also contains language explicitly delineating the scope of the
Court's holding:
CERTIFICATE.... [T]his Court is of opinion, that, since the adoption of the
constitution of the United States, a State has authority to pass a bankrupt law,
provided such law does not impair the obligation of contracts, within the
meaning of the constitution, and provided there be no act of Congress in force
to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, conflicting with such law. This
Court is farther of opinion, that the act of New-York, which is pleaded in this
case, so far as it attempts to discharge the contract on which this suit was instituted, is a law impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the
constitution of the United States, and that the plea of the defendant is not a
good and sufficient bar of the plaintiffs action.
Id. (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 197-98.
10s 25 U.S. 213 (1827).
106 According to David P. Currie, "Ogden was the only constitutional case in thirty-four
years in which Marshall signed a dissent, and he took Story and Duvall with him." DAVID
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION JN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
1789-1888, at 151 (1985).
The Court addressed two issues in Ogden. The first was left open in Sturges-whether
a state debtor discharge law violated the Contracts Clause as applied to a contract entered
into after the statute had been enacted. See Ogden, 25 U.S. at 254 (stating that "whether
the obligation of a contract is impaired by a State bankrupt or insolvent law, which dis102
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tional case 10 7 -is the most explicit:
It is not the terms of the law, but its effect, that is inhibited by the

constitution. A law may be in part constitutional, and in part unconstitutional. It may, when applied to a given case, produce an effect
which is prohibited by the constitution; but it may not, when applied
to a case differently circumstanced, produce such prohibited effect.
Whether the law under consideration, in its effects and operation
upon the contract sued on in this case, be a law impairing the obligation of this contract, is the only necessary inquiry. 108

Justice Thompson's and Justice Washington's opinions also
exhibit two important operative principles: (1) the Constitution is concerned with effects and not words, and (2) a statute may be void in
part and valid in part. Wrote Justice Thompson: "It was not denied on
the argument, and, I presume, cannot be, but that a law may be void
in part and good in part; ... it may be void, so far as it has a retrospective application to past contracts, and valid, as applied prospectively
to future contracts." 109 Similarly, Justice Washington commented:
"[W]hich ever way we turn, ... we are met by this overruling and
admitted distinction, between those which operate retrospectively,
and those which operate prospectively. In all of them, the law is pronounced to be void in the first class of cases, and not so in the
second. " 110
charges ... liability under a contract entered into in that State after the passage of the act"
is a question that "has never before been distinctly presented to the consideration of this
Court, and decided"). On this issue, the Court ruled that prospective application of a
debtor discharge law did not impair the obligation of a contract. Id. at 368-69 (Johnson,
J.). The second issue related to territorial limits on legislative jurisdiction. On this issue,
Justice Johnson joined the three dissenters from the Court's disposition of the first issue
and held that the New York debtor discharge Jaw could not constitutionally be applied to
the detriment of Saunders, a citizen of Kentucky who had "never voluntarily subjected
himself to [New York's] laws, otherwise than by the origin of his contract." Id. at 358.
Justice Johnson summarized the differential effect of these conclusions on the validity of
the New York debtor discharge Jaw: "[A]s between citizens of the same State, a discharge
of a bankrupt by the Jaws of that State, is valid as it affects posterior contracts; [and] as
against creditors, citizens of other States, it is invalid as to all contracts." Id. at 368-69.
101 CURRIE, supra note 106, at 194-95 (1985) ("When we attempt to analyze the work of
individual Justices, the most striking fact is that most of Marshall's brethren were nearly
invisible .... Trimble wrote once, for himself alone, to uphold the prospective bankruptcy
Jaw.").
108 Ogden, 25 U.S. at 316.
109 Id. at 295 (Johnson, J.).
no Id. at 262 (Washington, J.). The Court applied the distinction between retrospective
and prospective application when assessing Contracts Clause challenges not only to debtor
discharge Jaws, but also to other types of statutes. In Bronson v. Kinzie, for example, the
Court held invalid an Illinois mortgage moratorium law that limited the remedies available
to a lender as applied to mortgages entered into prior to the law's passage. 42 U.S. (1
How.) 311, 320-22 (1843). The Court's opinion explicitly recognized that the law could be
applied constitutionally to mortgages entered into after the statute's enactment. Id. at 321.
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"To the Extent of Such Collision and Repugnancy"

The Court did not limit the foregoing principles shaping its
approach to partial unconstitutionality to the Contracts Clause alone.
When the Marshall Court's Commerce Clause and Import-Export
Clause doctrines ran up against the exercise of state powers
addressing the same subject matter as federal law, the same principles
of partial unconstitutionality greased the gears of the federal machine
to keep it running. Two pairs of cases-each consisting of a Marshall
opinion followed by an opinion by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw for the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court-illustrate this point.
The first pair of cases, Gibbons v. Ogden 111 and Norris v.
Boston, 112 addresses the distribution of power to regulate interstate
commerce. Gibbons provided an application-specific framework for
analyzing displacement of state law by federal law, which the later
decision in Norris relied upon in elaborating its approach to the
problem of partial unconstitutionality. Rather than decide the
momentous question that consumed much of the argument in
Gibbons-whether the states possessed a concurrent power to regulate interstate commerce-Marshall rested his decision on the actual
existing conflict between the federal statute under which Gibbons had
obtained his license and the grant of exclusivity resulting from New
York state statutes. 113 The Court asked "whether the laws of
New-York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that State, have, in
their application to this case, come into collision with an act of
Relatedly, in Woodruftv. Trapnall, the Court partially invalidated legislation that repealed
a provision of the charter of the Bank of Arkansas providing that its notes would be
accepted in payment of public debts. 51 U.S. (1 How.) 190, 207 (1851). This legislation
impaired the obligation of contracts with respect to bank notes issued before the repeal,
but was valid with respect to bank notes issued after. See id. at 206. ("That the state had the
right to repeal the above section may be admitted. And the emissions of the bank subsequently are without the guaranty. But the notes in circulation at the time of the repeal are
not affected by it."). Again, in each of these cases, statutory invalidity meant that the
statute would not be given effect with respect to certain circumstances, not that the act was
itself invalid. See id. at 207 ("The power of the legislature to repeal the section, the stock of
the bank being owned by the state, is not controverted; but that act cannot affect the notes
in circulation at the time of the repeal.").
ll1 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
112 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 282 (1842).
113 Gibbons was the owner of two steamboats which he operated as ferries between
New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey, pursuant to a federal license that permitted him to engage in the "coasting trade." Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 2. Ogden possessed the
exclusive right under New York law to operate steamboat service on New York waters; he
had been assigned this right by Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston, who had received it
from a succession of New York statutes. Id. at 1-2. Ogden sued in New York state court for
an injunction to enforce his exclusive right, and he obtained a permanent injunction, which
he successfully defended on appeal within the New York system. Id. at 1-3. The Supreme
Court heard Gibbons's appeal. Id. at 3.
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Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles
him." 114
In Norris v. Boston, Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw combined
this application-specific approach with the background principle that a
statute may be valid in part and void in part. Norris was an assumpsit
action to recover money paid under a Massachusetts law placing a per
capita tax on foreign passengers brought by ship into Massachusetts
ports. 115 En route to denying recovery on the ground that the statute
was not repugnant to the Constitution, Chief Justice Shaw framed the
applicable test (which he drew from Gibbons) as providing that "if the
specific means [adopted by state and federal law] do not conflict with
each other, both may stand and operate together, though they operate
at the same time, upon the same subjects. " 116 If there is any conflict,
the state statute is void to the extent of the conflict but no further:
This act having been passed in due form, and received the sanction
of all branches of the legislature, ... is valid and binding, unless it
comes in conflict with the constitution of the United States or some
114 Id. at 210 (emphasis added). This focus obviated the question of concurrent power
because "[s]hould this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether [New York's] laws were
passed in virtue of a concurrent power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States,' or in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and
police." Id. According to the Court, "[t]he real and sole question seems to be, whether a
steam machine, in actual use, deprives a vessel of the privileges conferred by a license"
issued under a 1793 federal statute regulating the coasting trade. Id. at 219. The Court
concluded that "the act of a State inhibiting the use [of its waters or entering ports] to any
vessel having a license under the act of Congress, comes ... in direct collision with [the
federal] act." Id. at 221. The Court's holding, therefore, was that "so much of the laws of
the State of New York, as prohibits vessels licensed according to the laws of the United
States, from navigating the waters of the State of New York, by means of fire or steam, is
repugnant to the said constitution, and void." Id. at 240 (emphases added).
115 45 Mass., at 282. The Supreme Court reversed the Norris decision, which it decided
together with Smith v. Turner, a similar New York case, in the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (1
How.) 283 (1849). But the Court's reasoning in reversal did not call into question Shaw's
reasoning regarding partial unconstitutionality. In fact, the arguments of counsel and the
opinions of the Justices in the Passenger Cases reveal the same provision-specific approach
to partial unconstitutionality taken by Chief Justice Shaw. Section 3 of the statute at issue
in Norris contained the invalid tax provision, while Section 1 authorized the boarding of
ships for inspection, and Section 2 authorized the port city to require payment of a $1000
bond for "any lunatic, idiot, maimed, aged, or infirm person" as security against such individuals becoming "a city, town, or State charge" after landing. Id. at 409. The Court's
constitutional reasoning invalidated only Section 3. Id. at 410. Indeed, both Justice Grier
(in the majority) and Justice Taney (in dissent) explicitly stated that Massachusetts's power
under Section 2 was not in question in the case. See id. at 456-57 (Grier, J.); id. at 469
(Taney, J., dissenting). The Court took a similarly narrow approach in Smith v. Turner, the
companion New York case. Id. at 283. Smith was a challenge to certain sections in a New
York statute requiring the payment by ship captains of a per capita tax on foreign passengers brought into the Port of the City of New York. Id. at 284. The Court's invalidation of
the tax was limited to these sections and did not affect the other sections. Id. at 572.
116 Id. at 294.
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law made in pursuance of its enumerated powers. If it be in any
respect repugnant thereto, to that extent it is inoperative and void;
because the constitution of the United States, and all laws and treaties made in pursuance of the powers vested in the general government, are the supreme law of the land. But an act of the State
legislature is no further void, than as its provisions are thus repugnant
to the constitution or laws of the United States; and consequently the
same act may be valid in part and void in part. 117

This approach to partial unconstitutionality limited the relevant
inquiry for judicial review to the constitutionality of the specific provision giving rise to the claimed constitutional defect.11 8 This limitation
arose from the fact that it was only this constitutional question whose
resolution was necessary to the assumpsit action in Norris. 119
A second pair of cases, this time involving the Import-Export
Clause, illuminates the original approach to partial unconstitutionality
through another one-two combination of (i) a landmark Marshall
decision on federal-state authority, followed by (ii) a later Shaw decision applying the Marshall decision. In Brown v. Maryland, Chief
Justice Marshall formulated the "original package" doctrine to implement the Import-Export Clause.12° This doctrine divided federal and
state authority depending on whether "the importer has so acted upon
the thing imported, that ... it has perhaps, lost its distinctive character
as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State
"121

Id. at 287-88 (emphases added).
See id. at 288. ("The question therefore in the present case, is, not whether some
single provision may not be found in this act, which may conflict with the law of the United
States, but whether the provision requiring the master or agent of a vessel, arriving within
the limits of the State, with alien passengers on board, liable to become chargeable to the
State, to pay two dollars for each of such passengers, before he can be permitted to land
them, conflicts with that law.").
119 Norris, 45 U.S. at 284.
120 25 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 419, 441-42 (1827). In Brown, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a license requirement for liquor importers and wholesalers who were prosecuted for selling without a license. Id. at 436. The challenged license requirement was an
amendment to a statute that had previously required only retailers to pay duties. Id. at 450
(Thompson, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court invalidated the
importer/wholesaler license requirement, which functioned as a tax on imports, while
leaving the retailer licensing scheme intact. Id. at 459. This holding depended on the
Court's identification of the point at which the constitutional prohibition on state taxation
of imports no longer prevented the states from levying a tax on goods that had previously
been imported. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that "when the importer has so acted upon
the thing imported, that it has become incorporate and mixed up with the mass of property
in the country, it has perhaps lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become
subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer,
in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is
too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution." Id. at 441-42.
121 Id. at 441-42.
117
118
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Ten years later, Chief Justice Shaw applied this doctrine in
Commonwealth v. Kimball, in which an individual sought to overturn
his conviction for unlicensed retailing of spirituous liquors. 122 Kimball
argued that the Massachusetts law prohibiting such sales was an
unconstitutional state regulation of interstate commerce and an
unconstitutional duty on imports. 123 The court rejected both
arguments. 124
Shaw's analysis rejecting Kimball's Import-Export Clause claim
provides an example of how the original approach to partial unconstitutionality accommodated laws that by their terms could reach more
broadly than constitutionally permissible but that in their application
were within state power. Kimball argued that the license requirement
was unconstitutional because "the prohibition to sell is general, and
makes no distinction between the cases of a sale by the importer of
imported spirits, in the original packages ... and the sale of spirits not
imported, or not by the importer, or not in the original packages." 125
Shaw rejected this argument in two steps. First, he noted that the
unconstitutionality of certain applications of the state law would have
no effect on its constitutionality in other applications. 126 Second, he
observed that there was no proof that the law as applied to Kimball
was being used to penalize the sale of imported liquor. 127 Because
41 Mass. (1 Pick.) 359, 361-62 (1837).
Id. at 361.
124 Id. at 363. Addressing the Commerce Clause argument first, Shaw described the
challenged law as a health and welfare regulation, which the state could permissibly
enforce except to the extent that it "shall happen, in any particular instance, to come
directly in conflict with the operation of some law of the United States made in pursuance
of its enumerated powers." Id. at 361. In the case of such a conflict, the Supremacy Clause
dictates that "to the extent of such collision and repugnancy, the law of the State must
yield, and to that extent and no further, it is rendered by such repugnancy, inoperative and
void." Id. Such a conflict "is not to be presumed, but ... must be clearly shown and
established." Id. at 365. Kimball proved no such conflict-he failed to show that the law
regulating retail sales of spirituous liquors would impede federal law-and he therefore
lost on this challenge. Id.
125 Id. at 362.
126 See id. ("Supposing the law could be construed to be repugnant to the constitution of
the United States, in so far as it prohibited the sale of imported spirits by the importer in
the original package, it would be void thus far and no further, and in all other respects
conforming to the acknowledged power of the State government, it would be in full
force."). Elaborating on this reasoning, Shaw stated further that "[w]hether legal enactments, some of which it is competent for the legislature to make, and others not, are contained in the same or in different sections of a statute, can make no difference." Id. The
reason is that "it is not the defect of form, but of power, that invalidates any of them; it is,
therefore, the subject matter, and not the arrangement of the language in which it is
embodied, that is to be regarded in deciding whether any provision is constitutional or
not." Id.
127 Id. ("If ... the defendant had offered to show in his defence, that the spirits charged
to have been illegally sold by [the defendant], without license, contrary to the statute, were
122
123
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Kimball made no such showing, his challenge failed. 128 In other words,
Shaw limited judicial review by looking to the constitutionality of
state power as actually exercised under the statute, rather than by
looking to the terms of the statute on their own.
The application-specific operation of judicial review in the foregoing cases depended on background principles of partial unconstitutionality. These principles contributed to a working federalism by
limiting the scope of constitutional adjudication. By virtue of the displacement approach used in these cases, a state statute would remain
valid and enforceable except to the extent that its application conflicted with federal law. Unlike modem decisions, as-applied adjudication did not depend on implicit or explicit satisfaction of a test for
severability. Conversely, no inseverability argument was advanced to
expand the scope of adjudication beyond the specific application or
applications giving rise to the claim of unconstitutionality.
3.

Occasions of Inseverability

A final pair of cases illustrates the distance between the earlier
approach to partial unconstitutionality and the modem conception of
what situations provide occasions for inseverability analysis. The contrast between an 1845 tax case and the Court's inseverability-based
invalidation of the federal income tax in 1895 reveals the substantial
shift in constitutional adjudication that modern severance doctrine
enabled.
In the 1845 case Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, the Court partially
invalidated a general tax on banks that operated in some circumstances in violation of the Contracts Clause.129 Gordon involved a
bank tax that did not by its terms distinguish between banks whose
charters exempted them from increased taxation and those whose
charters did not. 130 The Court invalidated the statute as applied to
banks whose charters exempted them from increased taxation while
explicitly recognizing and preserving the statute's applicability to nonexempted banks. 131 Neither the Court nor any of the banks suggested
imported by himself, and sold in the original package, it would then have given rise to the
question which has been mainly argued in the present case.").
128 Id.
129 44 U.S. (1 How.) 133, 149-50 (1845).
130 Id. at 144.
131 Id. at 150; see also State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (1 How.) 369 (1853) (invalidating statutory tax increase applied to banks whose charter, under prior act, provided for
lower rates); Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (1 How.) 301 (1848) (invalidating state
restrictions on negotiability of bank notes because prior act required that they be negotiable). Because the doctrinal test for invalidity under the Contracts Clause at the time
looked only at specific contracts at issue, the extent of invalidity in Knoop was limited to
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that the unconstitutionality of certain applications of the law could
also result in the invalidity of the law in its constitutional applications
through the use of inseverability reasoning.
The absence of such inseverability arguments from Gordon is
uninteresting given the then-prevailing approach to partial unconstitutionality, but it is striking in comparison with the later decision in
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. 132 In this 1895 decision, the
Supreme Court voted 5-4 to invalidate entirely the income tax portions of an 1894 revenue act. 133 The Court first held that the tax was
unconstitutional insofar as it was based on income from both real and
personal property. 134 The Court next concluded that the remainder of
the income tax was inseparable from the tax on income derived from
real and personal property; thus, the income tax had to be struck
down in its entirety.13 5 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fuller reasoned that the holding of unconstitutionality regarding income
derived from real and personal property would eliminate "by far the
largest part of the anticipated revenue" from the income tax, leaving
"the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or vocations .... " 136 Eliminating only the unconstitutional portions of the income tax, then, would cause "what was intended as a tax
on capital" to become instead "a tax on occupations and labor." 137

the statute's applications to only those contracts actually impaired: "[T]he tax law of 1851
... impairs the obligation of the contract, which is prohibited by the Constitution of the
United States, and, consequently, that the act of 1851, as regards the tax thus imposed, is
void." Id. at 392 (emphasis added). Similar reasoning appears in Planters' Bank. See 47
U.S. at 334 ("[T]he law under which this action has been abated must be considered as
having impaired the obligation of contracts, and therefore to be in this respect unconstitutional, and the judgment of the State court erroneous.") (emphasis added).
132 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
133 The Court heard argument twice in Pollock. Its first decision did not resolve the
entire case because the Court was evenly divided on several questions. See Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895). In its first decision, the Court held
that a tax on rents or incomes from real estate was unconstitutional. Id. But the Court was
evenly divided on the remaining questions, which included: (1) whether the invalidity of
the tax on rents and income from real property invalidated the whole act; (2) whether the
tax on income derived from personal property was unconstitutional; and (3) whether any
other parts of the income tax were unconstitutional. Id. Because the effect of an even
division is to affirm the judgment below, which in this case had rejected the constitutional
challenge in its entirety, the only portion of the law that was unconstitutional after the first
decision was the income tax on rents and income from real estate. Id. The second decision
is discussed in the text above.
134 Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635.
135 Id. at 637.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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Because such a tax was not intended by Congress, the Court held that
the income tax provisions had to fall in their entirety.138
Discussing Pollock a few decades later, Robert Stem observed
the close connection between the Justices' severability analyses and
their views on the merits of the case: "The judges who disapproved of
the law thought it was inseparable, while those who regarded it as
constitutional also took a contrary position on the question of separability. "139 By that time, Stem was working within the legislative-intent
approach to severability, however, so he did not appreciate just how
far the Court's reasoning departed from its earlier approach to partial
unconstitutionality. Under that earlier approach, the idea that the
resulting relative tax burden from a holding of partial unconstitutionality should be a factor in the Court's consideration of the validity of
the income tax as a whole was, quite literally, inconceivable.
C.

The Stealthy Rise of Modern Severability Doctrine

The foregoing cases reveal an internally coherent, transsubstantive approach to the problem of partial unconstitutionality.
The cases are not idiosyncratic but instead are part of a general framework applied in both state and federal courts for several decades prior
to the rise of severability doctrine. A basic principle governed:
Statutes are invalid so far as they are repugnant to superior law, but
no further. 140
Why has this original approach to partial unconstitutionality languished in obscurity? One reason is framing. Rather than view partial
Id.
Stern, supra note 15, at 113.
140 Although I have not undertaken to research the approach to partially unconstitutional (or otherwise partially invalid} statutes before Marbury, the limited evidence that I
have come across is consistent with the approach described above. See Hutchins v. Player,
(1663) 124 Eng. Rep. 585, 610 (C.P.) ("[T]hat part of the act which concerns pitching cloths
at Blackwell Hall, and the hallage, is purely distinct, and hath no relation to that part of the
act which concerns the factors; and, therefore, the one part, as I conceive, shall not vitiate
the other. And this construction of the act, as it is agreeable with common reason, that
what is good shall not be vitiated by what is bad, so it is also agreeable with the reason of
the law."); JOSEPH HENRY SMrrn, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN
PLANTATIONS 628 (1950) (reporting on 1760 opinion by two crown law officers that "the
King in Council lacked the power to disallow in part Pennsylvania acts," but that "there
may be cases in which particular provisions may be void ab initio though other parts of the
law may be valid, as in clauses where any act of Parliament may be contraversed or any
legal right of a private subject bound without his consent"); 1 JOHN STRANGE, REPORTS OF
ADJUDGED CASES IN THE COURTS OF CHANCERY, KING'S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, AND
ExcHEOUER 469 (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1795) ("There is no doubt but a bylaw may be good in part, and void for the rest; for where it consists of several particulars, it
is to all purposes as several by-laws, though the provisions are thrown together under the
form of one." (reporting on Fazakerley v. Wiltshire, {1716) 88 Eng. Rep. 754 (K.B.))); see
also HAMBURGER, LAw AND JumcIAL DUTY 262 n.11 (citing cases).
138

139

Reprinted with ~ennission of New York University School of Law

June 2010]

PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

769

unconstitutionality as a phenomenon in its own right, Stern's foundational scholarship took severability doctrine as a given, traced it back
to its origins, and dismissed the earlier framework by observing that
"[t]he problem of separability, as we know it today, was not recognized" in those earlier years. 141 That approach made sense for Stem;
he sought to bring order to the modern doctrine, not discard it.
The problem from this framing comes in the shift from Stern's
position142 to the more recent claim that "[s]everability doctrine has
been with us since the beginnings of judicial review." 143 This anachronistic attribution of implicit severability all the way back to Marbury
accommodates that case within the now-prevailing excision-based
approach, but it obscures the original displacement-based approach
that Marbury actually exemplifies.
Another reason for the obscurity of the original approach is that
the background principles informing the original approach to partial
unconstitutionality were so uncontroversial that they did their work
without much discussion in the Court's opinions. Severability doctrine
now has a name and can easily be identified. By contrast, the background principles regarding partial unconstitutionality in the first several decades of judicial review were not grouped together in their own
named doctrinal category. Nobody argued against these principles. As
a result, the identification of partial unconstitutionality as a problem
for analysis in its own right did not occur until after the modern
intent-based approach to severability emerged.
In 1854, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court delivered an opinion in Warren v. Mayor &
Aldermen of Charlestown 144 that Stern credits as the first decision to
hold, on the basis of legislative intent, that the invalid parts of a
statute could nullify the statute in its entirety. 145 This doctrinal innova141 Stern, supra note 15, at 79. Stern's use of "separability" rather than "severability"
reflected the more prevalent usage when Stern wrote in 1937. The terms are understood
today to be interchangeable. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1331 n.55 ("The terms 'severable'
and 'separable,' and 'severability' and 'separability,' are treated as synonymous by the
courts and in the literature .... ").
142 Stern, supra note 15, at 79.
143 Gans, supra note 55, at 639; see also Dorf, supra note 26, at 250 (describing Court's
opinion in Marbury as applying "the same presumption of severability" as in Yazao );
Shumsky, supra note 15, at 232 (describing Marbury as reflecting "early assumption that
partially unconstitutional statutes were to be severed").
144 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 94 (1854).
145 Stern, supra note 15, at 79-80. It turns out that Warren was not, as Stern thought, the
first decision to use a legislative intent test to hold "that the invalid parts of a law might
nullify the remainder." Id. Others have followed Stern's error on this point. See, e.g.,
Nagle, supra note 15, at 212; Shumsky, supra note 15, at 233. In actuality, the Arkansas
Supreme Court decided two cases before Warren, one in 1851 and another in 1853, in
which the court relied on legislative intent to conclude that statutes' unconstitutional parts
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tion was to provide a way for a court to hold entirely invalid a statute
that was only partially unconstitutional, based on judicial perception
of whether the legislature would have enacted the statute absent its
unconstitutional parts. Stern summarized the legislative-intent test of
Warren as follows:
[I]f constitutional and unconstitutional portions of a statute [are] 'so
mutually connected with and dependent on each other ... as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and
that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not
pass the residue independently' the entire statute must fall. 146

Stern's summary accurately captures the manner in which Warren
rendered severability dependent on legislative intent. But Stern did
not explain from where Shaw drew this test. A clue comes from the
omission in Stem's quotation: The omitted language in the quote
required the reviewing court to determine whether the unconstitutional and constitutional parts of the challenged statute were dependent on each other "as conditions, considerations or compensations
for each other. " 147 As Mark Movsesian has explained, "Chief Justice
Shaw's reference in Warren to 'conditions, considerations, or compensations' is significant. These, of course, are basic concepts of contracts
law." 148 In Warren, then, Shaw rendered statutory severability dependent on a legislative intent-based test drawn from contract law, apparently based on the implicit assumption that a statute is "a bargain
among the legislators who enacted it. " 149 The limiting principle, in
Movsesian's words, is that a "court could not sever a provision so central as to amount to 'consideration' for the statute's passage." 150 Shaw
thus advanced a new approach to partial unconstitutionality through
his Warren decision.
Although Shaw's development of a contract law-inspired, intentbased test for severability marked a shift from the earlier approach to
partial unconstitutionality, the shift was subtle. The legislative-intent
limitation attributed to Warren did not spring fully formed from Chief
were inseparable from their constitutional parts, requiring invalidation of the entire statutes. See Washington v. State, 13 Ark. 752, 763-64 (1853) (invalidating billiards licensing
scheme); Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 481, 501-03 (1851) (invalidating act expanding jurisdiction of justices of peace). But there is no point in getting hung up on figuring out precisely
what was first in time: The Arkansas cases proved to be less influential than Warren, which
appears first in eminence if not in time; and any other earlier cases had to have been even
less influential than the Arkansas cases.
146 Stern, supra note 15, at 80 (quoting Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 99).
147 Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 99.
148 Movsesian, supra note 15, at 62.
149 Id.
1so Id.
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Justice Shaw's mind but was prefigured by earlier formulations that
were susceptible to transmutation into the legislative-intent approach.
These formulations appeared in cases that applied a "void in part,
valid in remainder" rule of decision, but did so in a way that presaged
the future legislative-intent limitation.
Clark v. Ellis, an 1826 decision of the Indiana Supreme Court,
supplies one such formulation. 151 The issue in Clark was whether an
assault-and-battery prosecution was within the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace who had held the trial and delivered the sentence. 152
An Indiana statute vested justices of the peace with jurisdiction to
preside over jury trials for assaults and batteries in cases resulting in
fines of no more than twenty dollars. 153 But the Indiana Constitution
limited the justice of the peace's jurisdiction to certain cases resulting
in fines of no more than three dollars. 154 The court held that the justice of the peace acted within his constitutional jurisdiction because
the decision giving rise to the constitutional challenge had resulted in
a fine of three dollars. 155 In explaining why the exercise of jurisdiction
in that case was constitutional even though the terms of the statutory
grant exceeded the constitutional limitation, the court stated that "a
part of an act of assembly being unconstitutional, does not affect a
constitutional part of the same act relative to the same subject." 156
Had the court stopped with this statement, there would have been
little in Clark for transmutation into modern severability doctrine.
But the court continued: "That part which is unconstitutional, is considered as if stricken out of the act; and if enough remains to be intelligibly acted upon, it is considered as the law of the land." 157 It is but a
short step from this idea that the unconstitutional part "is considered
as if stricken out of the act" to the modern notion that judges should
look to legislative intent to determine whether to excise provisions
from statutes.
Another early state case, Campbell v. Mississippi Union Bank,
also illustrates how the original displacement approach was suscep151
152

2 Blackf. 8 (Ind. 1826).
Id. at 9. Clark was not itself the prosecution but apparently a defamation action that

followed that prosecution. Id. at 8-9. The plaintiff, Clark, had testified against Ellis before
the justice of the peace, and Ellis accused Clark of committing perjury. Id. at 9. Clark then
sued Ellis, and one of the elements of Clark's cause of action required showing that Eilis's
accusations "were spoken with reference to a swearing" in the trial before the justice of the
peace. Id. Ellis demurred on the ground that the proceeding before the justice of the peace
was outside of the latter's jurisdiction. Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 9-10.
156 Id. at 10.
157 Id.
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tible to transmutation into the modem intent-based excision
approach. 1 58 In discussing the relationship between two acts passed at
different times (the latter of which was supplemental to the first one),
the court explained that a previous valid act could not be destroyed by
a subsequent void one. 159 Said the court: "If one be void the other will
not be affected, unless they be so essentially connected and blended
together as to make one useless and inoperative without the other." 160
By introducing a qualification to the general principle that "[i]f one be
void the other will not be affected," this decision presages modem
severability doctrine's intent-based test. Admittedly, modem severability doctrine goes beyond asking whether what remains would be
"useless and inoperative" to inquiring into the hypothetical intent of
the enacting legislature. But the fact that Campbell conceptualizes the
"useless and inoperative" remainder as a qualification of the general
principle of void only so far as repugnant-rather than as an independent reason why the remainder could not be enforced as law-reveals
the short conceptual distance between the earlier approach to partial
constitutionality and modern severability doctrine.
In any event, the novelty of Chief Justice Shaw's invocation of
legislative intent as a test for severability was not recognized at the
time it was introduced, or even in the immediately following decades.
Thomas Cooley, in the 1868 first edition of his influential treatise,
matter-of-factly included a legislative intent-based test for severability in his discussion of partial unconstitutionality, supported with
an impressive citation of approximately two dozen cases (only some of
which actually used the legislative-intent approach). 161 Cooley's recitation of the legislative intent approach portrayed it as seamlessly continuous with what preceded it, which effectively buried the earlier
approach to partial unconstitutionality.
A comparison of the first (1857) 16 2 and second (1874) 163 editions
of Theodore Sedgwick's A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the
7 Miss. (6 Howard) 625 (Err. & App. 1842).
Id. at 676-77.
160 Id. at 677.
161 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 177-81
(1st ed. Boston, Little, Brown 1868).
162 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed.
New York, Voorhies 1857). Born to a prominent American family in 1811, Sedgwick was a
New York lawyer who authored a treatise on damages in addition to this treatise on interpretation. THE y ALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 487-88 (Roger K.
Newman, ed., 2009).
163 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (John Norton Porn158
159
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Interpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law
reveals the quickness and stealth of the incorporation of the legislative
intent test into constitutional adjudication.
The first edition of Sedgwick's treatise states: "The principle that
a statute is void only so far as its provisions are repugnant to the constitution, that one provision may thus be void and this not affect other
provisions of the statute, has been frequently declared." 164 In addition, Sedgwick block-quotes an 1854 decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court authored by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw:
'The principle is now well understood,' says the Supreme Court of
the State of Massachusetts, 'that where a statute has been passed by
the legislature under all the forms and sanctions requisite to the
making of laws, some part of which is not within the competency of
the legislative power, or is repugnant to any provision of the constitution, such part thereof will be adjudged void and of no avail;
whilst all other parts of the act, not obnoxious to the same objection, will be held valid and have the force of law. There is nothing
inconsistent in declaring one part of the same statute valid and
another part void.'165

That is the entirety of Sedgwick's discussion: one sentence stating
a general principle followed by a block quote from Chief Justice Shaw.
There is no mention of "separability," "severability," or "severance,"
nor qualifications of this general principle.
Although Sedgwick's description is spare, three features are
worth noting. First, the only function of the principle that "void in one
part does not mean void in any other parts" is to limit the scope of
judicial invalidation. Because of this principle, the taint of unconstitueroy ed., 2d ed. New York, Baker, Voorhies 1874). Pomeroy was a professor at the New
York University School of Law and the Hastings School of Law, as well as a prolific treatise writer, editor, and case reporter, in the last third of the nineteenth century. See John C.
Leary, John Norton Pomeroy 1828-1885: A Biographical Sketch, 47 L. LIBR. J. 138, 139-42
(1954).
164 SEDGWICK, supra note 162, at 489. Sedgwick's authorities were: Ely v. Thompson, 10
Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh) 70 (1820); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Clark v.
Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8 (Ind. 1826); City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837);
Commonwealth v. Kimball, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 359 (1837); Edwards v. Pope, 4 Ill. (3
Scam.) 465 (1842); Norris v. Boston, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 282 (1842); and Fisher v. McGirr, 67
Mass. (1 Gray) 1 (1854). But the profusion of case citations can be misleading. Sedgwick's
cases are spread across two footnotes. For each footnote, the lead cited case contains the
principle articulated by Sedgwick and then itself cites the other cases that appear in
Sedgwick's footnotes. In effect, then, Sedgwick relied on two cases, Edwards for the first
sentence and Fisher for the block quote. Id.
165 SEDGWICK, supra note 162, at 489 (quoting Fisher, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) at 21-22).
Although decided in the same year as Warren, Fisher preceded that watershed case. Fisher
was decided in the Supreme Judicial Court's March 1854 term, while Warren was decided
in the October 1854 term. See Fisher, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) at 1; Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at
84.
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tionality and consequent voidness attach only to the extent that the
statute's individual terms and applications are unconstitutional.
Second, this principle applies to a statute that "has been passed by the
legislature under all the forms and sanctions requisite to the making of
laws." 16 6 Its application presupposes a statute that is properly in existence as law. The principle provides for the continued existence of
some parts or provisions notwithstanding that other parts or provisions are void. Third, the principle does not depend on legislative
intent.
Sedgwick's 1874 second edition retains the same text as the first
edition but expands its discussion with an extensive note that discusses
the "question" of separability and the doctrinal test for determining
whether a statute is separable. 167 In less than two decades, then, a
brightline principle that an unconstitutional statutory provision has no
effect on other constitutional provisions in the same statute was transformed into a problem that only posed the "question" of separability
to be resolved by application of a doctrinal test. The shift to legislative
intent-based severability doctrine had already taken place.
The Supreme Court handed down the next landmark decision for
modern severability doctrine, United States v. Reese, 168 the following
year. The doctrinal innovation in Reese was the Supreme Court's
embrace of the understanding that, by enjoining only the unconstitutional applications of a statute that has valid and invalid applications,
a court may engage in forbidden judicial rewriting. 169 Reese involved
the federal prosecution of two municipal election inspectors in
Kentucky for refusing to count the vote of William Garner, an African
American.17° The Supreme Court upheld dismissal of the indictment
on the ground that the statute the officials were charged with violating
was not appropriate enforcement legislation under the Fifteenth
Amendment. 171 The Court recognized Congress's power to enact legislation punishing interferences with voting by state officials on
account of race but interpreted the statute to punish all interferences
with voting, regardless of whether the interferences were on account
of race. 172 As thus interpreted, the statute was unconstitutional. It
therefore could not form the basis of the indictments in Reese, even
166 SEDGWICK, supra note 162, at
167 SEDGWICK, supra note 163, at
168 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
169 See id. at 221 ("The question,

489 (quoting Fisher, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) at 21).
413-15, 413-14 n.(a).

then, to be determined, is, whether we can introduce
words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is
general only.").
170 Id. at 215.
171 Id. at 221-22.
172 Id. at 218, 220.
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though those indictments charged the denial of an individual's right to
vote on account of his race. 173 The Court stated, "[w]e are not able to
reject a part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder,
because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, if
there be any such, from that which is not. " 174 This conclusion followed
from the Court's earlier determination that "[i]f, taking the whole
statute together, it is apparent that it was not the intention of
Congress thus to limit the operation of the act, we cannot give it that
effect. " 175
The link in Reese between this intent-focused approach to statutory interpretation and the Court's conclusion as to inseparability was
the Court's conception of judicial review. The Court reasoned that the
"[t]he proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or disregarding words ... , but by inserting those that are not now there." 176
Having framed the question as "whether [the Court] can introduce
words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when,
as expressed, it is general only," the Court answered: "To limit this
statute in the manner now asked for would be to make a new law, not
to enforce an old one. This is no part of our duty." 177 In short, the
Court declined to apply severability reasoning on an application-byapplication basis here, stating that confining the statute to only its
constitutional applications would have required the Court to write in
words of limitation, which the Court took to be beyond the judicial
power.
The importance of Reese for our purposes lies not in its substantive constitutional holding but in the fact that it equates the idea of
giving effect to only the constitutional applications of a partially
unconstitutional statute with "mak[ing] a new law." 178 The Court has
continued to rely on Reese's caution against "substitut[ing] the judicial
for the legislative department of the government" 179 through trimming of a partially unconstitutional statute to leave only its constitutional applications. 180 In so doing, however, the Court has not
Id. at 215.
Reese, 92 U.S. at 221.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 221.
Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006)
("[The Court is] wary of legislatures who would rely on our intervention .... ");City of
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) ("The Constitution does not permit a legislature
to 'set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large."' (quoting
Reese, 42 U.S. at 221)); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 n.49 (1997) (same).
173
174
175
176
177
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reconciled that reliance with its 1960 decision in United States v.
Raines, which adopted an approach to the constitutionality of enforcement legislation opposite that of Reese .18 1
In present times, the excision-based legislative-intent approach is
so pervasive that West's Key system describes that approach as present in the early nineteenth century even when it was not. 1 8 2 And
while the coverage of severability doctrine in treatises is heavy with
case law, it is also uneven. For example, the 2001 sixth edition of
Sutherland's statutory interpretation treatise continues to describe
Reese as a "leading federal case" 183 without any mention of the
Court's rejection of Reese's approach to the constitutionality of federal enforcement legislation in Raines. The fact is that it has become
difficult to conceive of judicial review in any way other than excision.

***
Because the excision-based legislative-intent approach is now so
ingrained, it might be tempting to minimize the difference between
that approach and the original displacement approach by describing
the original approach in excision terms-for instance, by asserting that
the original approach represents nothing more than a blanket rule of
severability. This temptation should be avoided. Ignoring the distinctive displacement-based framing of the original approach to partial
unconstitutionality obscures the significant change in the conception
of the judicial role that the transition from displacement to excision
represents. Moreover, neglect of the displacement approach as an
alternative to excision has resulted in a failure of scholars and judges
to apprehend the distinctively destructive function of modern severance doctrine.
This Article's recovery of the original displacement approach to
partial unconstitutionality enables a before-and-after comparison that
upends the dominant view that severability doctrine saves partially
181 362 U.S. 17, 24 (1960) ("(T]o the extent Reese did depend on an approach inconsis·
tent with what we think the better one and the one established by the weightiest of the
subsequent cases, we cannot follow it here."); id. at 24-25 ("[I]f the complaint here called
for an application of the statute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment,
that should have been an end to the question of constitutionality.").
182 For example, the key-cited headnote for an 1826 state court decision that does not so
much as mention legislative intent describes the case as if the reasoning and disposition on
severability turned on it. See Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8, 1826 WL 1078 (Ind. 1826) ("Statute
may be valid in part and invalid in part, and invalid part may be disregarded, where the
two parts are not so intimately connected as to raise presumption that Legislature would
not have enacted one without other.").
183 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 608
(6th ed. 2001).

Reprinted with ~ennission of New York University School of Law

June 2010]

PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

777

unconstitutional statutes from total invalidity. 184 Before severance
doctrine emerged, displacement-based partial unconstitutionality doctrine was already doing precisely this. Prior to severability doctrine's
rise, courts routinely held an unconstitutional law void to the extent of
repugnancy, but no further; there was no "next step" in which courts
inquired into whether the legislature would have preferred no law at
all to the constitutional remainder. After severance emerged, partial
unconstitutionality (now seen as resulting from excision, and not displacement) became dependent on the satisfaction of a legislativeintent test. The "next step" of a legislative-intent analysis injects into
judicial review the possibility that invalidity extends beyond unconstitutionality, which occurs whenever severability doctrine results in a
holding of inseverability. In comparison with the original displacement approach, the distinctive function of modern severability doctrine is to enable total invalidity to flow from partial
unconstitutionality. Modern severability doctrine does not save; it
destroys.
III
DISPLACEMENT

Given that severability is not inevitable, and that existing doctrine is destructive and manipulable, the question arises: Is there a
better way? There is, and it is easy to implement. This Part describes
the approach of "displacement without inferred fallback law,"
explains why it is superior, identifies some of its limitations, and
answers potential objections. 185
184 See Dorf, supra note 8, at 370 (arguing that, without severability, "any judicial decision finding any law unconstitutional, on its face or as applied, would call into question the
entire legal code"); Metzger, supra note 18, at 887-88 ("If unconstitutional applications are
not severed, the statute cannot be applied to any litigant, even one making no claim of
constitutional protection for her conduct.").
185 This Article does not advocate any particular theory of constitutional interpretation,
such as originalism, nor does it argue that its proposed approach-displacement without
inferred fallback law-should be adopted because it is more faithful to the original
approach to partial unconstitutionality. The object of this Article is to retrieve a "useable
past" through the study of a neglected aspect of our constitutional tradition. See Cass R.
Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 CoLuM. L. REv. 601, 603 (1995) (describing idea
of "useable past" as oriented to "the goal of finding elements in history that can be brought
fruitfully to bear on current problems," and defending constitutional lawyers' search for a
useable past as distinct from "mere advocacy" or "history lite"). The method is not simply
to identify a discrete set of legal directives that can be ripped from the world of early- to
mid-nineteenth-century constitutional adjudication and burned into existing doctrine.
Instead, the method begins by trying to understand and appreciate how courts during that
time dealt with a practical problem that remains today, although understood within a different conceptual framework. It continues by correlating the practical solution from that
time period with the conceptual framework and doctrinal tools available in present times.
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Displacement Without Inferred Fallback Law

The alternative approach to partial unconstitutionality that I propose is displacement without inferred fallback law. This proposal (i)
replaces the excision-based approach to judicial review with a displacement-based approach, and (ii) limits the scope of displacement
by prohibiting inferences about counterfactual legislative intent used
to invalidate beyond the required displacement. Under this displacement-based approach, judicial review is an exercise in determining the
extent to which superior law displaces inferior law. Judicial review
calls for an "exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between
two contradictory laws." 186 Within this displacement approach, the
reviewing court does nothing to the inferior law except refuse to recognize it as enforceable law in resolving the particular case before it.
A helpful way to think about the move from excision to displacement is as the shift from a statute-minus approach to a statute-plus
approach. Laurence Tribe described the contrast between these two
approaches in his analysis of the Court's invalidation and severance of
the legislative veto in Chadha: 187
Rather than conceiving of the court as enforcing the law 'minus' its
invalidated provision-a law the legislature never enacted-perhaps one should simply understand the court as resolving the
controversy before it in terms of the entire body of law applicable to
that controversy, the entire Act of Congress (not the Act 'minus'
any offending portion) plus the Constitution. 188

Tribe describes this approach in passing as "the theory of
Marbury v. Madison," 189 but does not elaborate further. Moreover, I
have found no scholarship or modem judicial opinion that has explicitly developed the statute-plus approach beyond Tribe's identification
of it in his analysis of Chadha. As the elaboration of the original
approach to partial unconstitutionality in Part II has revealed, howAdditionally, although the proposed approach to partial unconstitutionality includes a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation, its adoption does not require the adoption
of textualism more generally. Even nontextualists may conclude that the use of imaginary
reconstruction for deciding what to do with partially unconstitutional statutes should be
abandoned for reasons specific to the particular context of discerning hypothetical intent
regarding partial unconstitutionality. As matters now stand, however, the disjunction
between textualism and severability doctrine runs in the other direction. See Caleb E.
Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 404-05 (2005) (explaining that
"[t]extualist judges regularly join opinions" that use "a species of imaginative reconstruction" to answer questions of severability).
186 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Bell ed., 2003).
187 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
188 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 81-82 (1985).
189 Id. at 318 n.116.
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ever, this statute-plus approach does indeed reflect "the theory of
Marbury v. Madison."190
Under this proposed displacement approach, the combination of
four basic background principles drawn from the original approach to
partial unconstitutionality will generally cause the scope of displacement to be coextensive with the scope of unconstitutionality. First, the
function of judicial review should be to determine what law governs in
the course of resolving a particular case. More specifically, judicial
review should be conceived of as the process of determining whether,
and, if so, to what extent, the Constitution supersedes otherwise operative law in resolving the particular case before the court. 191 Second,
upon recognition of a conflict, superior law must displace inferior law,
which is thereby deemed void. 192 Third, a law may be void in part and
valid in part, and the voidness of one part has no effect on the validity
of the other parts. 193 Fourth, a law is void to the extent of its conflict
with the Constitution, but no further. 1 9 4
Nothing in these principles rules out the possibility of facial invalidation flowing from application of substantive constitutional law. The
application of some constitutional tests results in a holding that the
challenged statute is completely invalid. 1 9 5 Recall, for instance, Justice
Bushrod Washington's holding in Golden v. Prince that a state debtorrelief law was "altogether unconstitutional" because the power to
190

Id.

See, e.g., Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542, 544 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509) (framing
issue as whether contested law "is repugnant to the constitution ... and, on that account, is
not to be regarded by the court, in this case").
192 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137, 178 (1803) (describing resolution of conflicting law as "very essence of judicial duty").
193 E.g., SEDGWICK, supra note 162, at 489.
194 E.g., Norris v. Boston, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 282, 287-88 (1842). A narrow qualifier on
this principle is that the remainder will not survive as enforceable law if it is incapable of
functioning independently of the unconstitutional provision or provisions of a statute. This
qualifier states something of a truism, but is worth noting nonetheless. Its presence in case
law predates the advent of the legislative intent-based approach to severability. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8, 10 (Ind. 1826) ("That part which is unconstitutional, is considered as if stricken out of the act; and if enough remains to be intelligibly acted upon, it is
considered as the law of the land."). The same qualifier is present in current law, although
it is now understood in legislative intent-based terms. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v.
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) ("Congress could not have intended a constitutionally
flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the
legislation is incapable of functioning independently."). This qualifier states a very narrow
limitation on the principle of "void to the extent of repugnancy, but no further." The test is
not whether the remainder would function in the manner intended by the legislature, but
whether the remainder is capable of functioning at all.
195 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 6, at 1338 (describing doctrinal tests that result in facial
invalidation, such as "purpose" tests and "suspect-content" tests).
191
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make bankruptcy laws was exclusively federal. 196 In such a circumstance, there is no resulting partial unconstitutionality and no need for
a court to adopt any particular approach to partially unconstitutional
statutes. 197
Just as there is nothing that forecloses facial invalidation as a
matter of constitutional law, there is nothing in the displacement
approach that would foreclose the legislature from enacting, in
advance of invalidation, fallback law that dictates what effect partial
unconstitutionality will have on the remainder of the statute. For
example, the legislature could link provisions with an inseverability
clause, so that they stand or fall together. 198 Absent some constitutional defect with the inseverability clause itself, the two linked provisions would live or die as a single unit even under the displacement
approach with no inferred fallback law. Alternatively, the legislature
could explicitly provide for some other type of fallback law, such as a
provision to be substituted in place of one found to be invalid. 199
When the legislature actually provides for such fallback law, the scope
of displacement will not be coextensive with the scope of unconstitutionality but will instead depend on what the legislature has actually
provided.
Golden, 10 F. Cas. at 547.
This is actually not always true. To be more precise, even when a challenged statute
is held facially invalid because the applicable test of substantive constitutional law requires
such a holding, it may be necessary to invoke some approach to partial unconstitutionality
to limit the spillover effects of the constitutional holding. For example, the Child Online
Protection Act held facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment in ACLU v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 207 (3d Cir. 2008), was not a stand-alone statute but Title XIV of
an omnibus appropriations bill. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). The First
Amendment defects that required facial invalidation of the Child Online Protection Act
had no effect on the other fifty-two titles in the omnibus bill.
198 See generally Friedman, supra note 23, at 909-17 (examining distinctive features of
inseverability clauses). Unlike an inseverability clause or a substitute provision, a severability clause would yield the same result as the absence of any fallback law. For that
reason, severability clauses are superfluous under my proposed approach. However, severability clauses will not be superfluous as long as courts addressing questions of partial
unconstitutionality continue to adopt the current approach of imaginative reconstruction
for severability questions. As long as inferences of inseverability or of some other type of
fallback law are permitted, severability clauses can serve to forestall those inferences and
are therefore not superfluous.
199 For example, the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act contained a "'backup'
definition of 'electioneering communication,' which would become effective if the primary
definition were 'held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support
the regulation provided herein."' McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 190 n.73 (quoting 2
U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)). Similarly, the statute at issue in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986), contained a "fallback" provision to take effect if a certain statutory provision were
held invalid. Id. at 735 (holding that "fallback" provisions in Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act were effective after statute was held unconstitutional).
196
197
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Because a displacement approach allows the legislature to provide for fallback law, it must be linked with an approach to statutory
interpretation for determining whether the legislature has in fact provided such fallback law. When looking for fallback law, the limit
imposed by my proposed approach is that a court should not ask what
the legislature would have done with respect to fallback law, only
what it actually did with respect to fallback law. In other words, the
court must be persuaded that the legislature actually legislated a
fallback provision before engaging in anything other than simple
displacement.
For several reasons discussed in the next section, this Article proposes a clear statement requirement for legislating fallback law.
Before turning to that discussion, however, this exposition of how the
proposed approach would operate concludes with an example that
illustrates how displacement without inferred fallback law would have
required a different outcome than existing severability doctrine in a
recent, high-profile decision. In addition to explaining how my proposed approach would function, this example also suggests some of
the advantages and disadvantages of displacement without inferred
fallback law.
Bismullah v. Gates 200 was a proceeding brought by detainees
seeking release from Guantanamo Bay pursuant to the procedure set
forth in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)-a federal statute
enacted in the wake of the Supreme Court's holding in Rasul v.
Bush 201 that statutory jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
extended to Guantanamo Bay. The DTA eliminated habeas review
for noncitizens held at Guantanamo Bay202 and put in its place a
system of military review by Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRTs) followed by review in the D.C. Circuit. 203
In the Supreme Court's first encounter with the DTA, in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 204 it held that Congress did not intend the elimination of
habeas corpus review to apply retroactively to cases that had been
filed prior to the enactment of the DTA. Congress responded to
Hamdan with the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which eliminated habeas corpus review again and made clear that this elimination
extended to all habeas corpus petitions on behalf of noncitizens held
551 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
202 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405(e)(l), 119 Stat. 3136,
3477 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)).
203 Id. § 1405(e)(2) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)).
204 548 U.S. 557, 584 (2006).
200

201
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at Guantanamo Bay, including those filed before the enactment of the
DTA and the MCA.2os
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that the MCA's
elimination of habeas corpus review for Guantanamo Bay detainees
violated the Suspension Clause. 206 In the wake of Boumediene, government lawyers faced a two-front battle: The first front was review by
CSRTs followed by the D.C. Circuit, as authorized by Congress in the
DTA; the second was habeas review pursuant to procedures that had
yet to be defined, as opened up by the Court in Boumediene. Confronted by this daunting prospect of dual proceedings, and having
suffered additional setbacks with respect to the scope of DTA review,
government lawyers developed an inseverability-based escape argument. They argued that Congress did not intend for the judiciary to
undertake DTA review-the only form of judicial review that
Congress had authorized-except as a replacement for habeas corpus
review eliminated in the same statute. 207 A unanimous panel of the
D.C. Circuit agreed. 208 This tactic successfully terminated the DTA
review process, in which the detainees had made substantial inroads
against the government, and consigned the detainees to exclusive reliance on a habeas process whose contours were still a work in progress.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Bismullah reveals a conventional
application of existing severability doctrine. 209 The court found that
"the text of the relevant provisions and the enactment of successive
jurisdiction-stripping provisions demonstrate clearly that the Congress
would not in the DTA have given [the D.C. Circuit Court] jurisdiction
to review CSRT determinations had it known its attempt to remove
the courts' jurisdiction over habeas petitions would fail." 210 According
to the panel opinion, the "basic objective" of the DTA was "to restrict
205 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36
(2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229 (2008).
206 128 S. Ct. at 2274.
201 See Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("(T]he Government
argues the Congress did not intend OTA§ 1005(e)(2), which gave this court alone jurisdiction to review CSRT determinations, to stand apart from the section of the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) that provides no court shall have jurisdiction to hear a detainee's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus .... ").
208 Id. at 1075 ("(W]e are confident the Congress would not have enacted
DTA § 1005(e)(2) in the absence of the statutory provision banning the courts from exercising jurisdiction over a detainee's habeas petition. Because the latter provision has been
held unconstitutional, the former must also fall.").
209 See id. at 1070 ("If it is evident the Congress would not have enacted one statutory
provision had it known that another provision would be held unconstitutional, then the
former provision cannot be severed from the latter, and the two provisions must fall
together.").
210 Id. at 1072.
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judicial review of the Executive's detention of persons designated
enemy combatants." 211 In light of this understanding of Congress's
objective, the court concluded that Congress "undoubtedly" would
not have enacted the jurisdiction-granting provision of the DTA (for
D.C. Circuit review of CSRT determinations) had it known that its
attempt to eliminate habeas review would be held unconstitutional.
The court reasoned that congressional creation of "an additional and
largely duplicative process by which a detainee could challenge his
detention in the court of appeals" is inconsistent with the basic objective of limiting detainee access to the courts. 21 2
The D.C. Circuit's elimination of DTA review appears unobjectionable in its application of the existing approach to partial unconstitutionality. Relying on declarations filed by the Directors of the CIA
and the FBI, the court noted that litigation resulting from detainees'
pursuit of parallel avenues of review would "be duplicative and
[would] greatly burden the Government's capacity to produce sensitive evidence." 213
Although the D.C. Circuit's imaginary reconstruction of
Congress's intent in creating DTA review did not rest on far-fetched
speculation, the decision nevertheless remains troubling. The problem
lies less in the ultimate result of eliminating duplicative proceedings
than in the way in which the government achieved this result-by
petitioning the judiciary rather than working through the politically
accountable branches. While government lawyers shouldered a heavy
burden in defending parallel claims, judicial lightening of this burden
forestalled the need for legislative accomplishment of the same task
and further centralized the formulation of detainee review policy in
the judicial branch. By eliminating the only form of detainee review
authorized by Congress, the court left as the only avenue for detainee
review the adjudication of habeas corpus petitions pursuant to procedures to be defined by the judiciary.
The D.C. Circuit could not have accomplished this result under
the proposed approach of displacement without inferred fallback law.
Instead, under this approach, the court would have inquired only
whether DTA review was itself constitutional and could function independently of the unconstitutional elimination of habeas. The Supreme
Court's decision in Boumediene that DTA review was not an adequate
substitute for habeas does not, of course, imply that DTA review is
itself unconstitutional. Indeed, as the detainees' counsel pointed out
211

212
213

Id.
Bismullah, 551 F.3d at 1075.
Id. at 1074.
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to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court's opinion in Boumediene
expressly stated that "the DTA ... process [remains] intact." 214 As the
government argued and the D.C. Circuit agreed, the Supreme Court
included this statement in Boumediene to identify "the limited extent
of its constitutional holding" and make it "as clear as possible that it
was not holding the review provisions of the DTA unconstitutional."215 Moreover, there is no question that the DTA review provision was "capable of functioning independently" of the invalid
provision, which eliminated habeas review for detainees at
Guantanamo Bay. 21 6 My proposed approach would have required that
DTA review be left in place in the absence of explicit legislative direction (which Congress had not, to that point, provided).
As reflection on the foregoing example suggests, my proposed
approach has both benefits and drawbacks. The next section outlines
some advantages of that approach, while the third and final section
considers qualifications and objections.

B.

Why Displacement Without Inferred Fallback Law Is Better

The "without inferred fallback law" part of the proposed displacement approach functions as a clear-statement requirement for
the legislature to express its intent for a holding of partial unconstitutionality to result in anything but simple displacement. The virtues of
a clear statement rule for severability doctrine have been elaborated
previously by John Copeland Nagle, Mark Movsesian, and Michael
Shumsky-all of whom presupposed an excision-based framework for
judicial review. 217 The clear statement aspect of my proposed displacement approach is functionally equivalent to theirs, and to that
extent shares its virtues: It is easy for courts to implement, it is consistent with past legislative and judicial practice, and it provides a clear
rule against which the legislature can act. On top of these beneficial
features, the switch from excision to displacement provides the additional advantages of explanatory simplicity and avoidance of judicial
lawmaking.
214
215
216

Id. at 1071 (quoting Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275) (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. ("The parties do not dispute that the first and second requirements for sever-

ability are met-that is, DTA § 1005(e)(2) is constitutional and could function
independently.").
217 See Movsesian, supra note 15, at 73-82 (recommending textual interpretation
approach to severability of statutory provisions); Nagle, supra note 15, at 232-46 (arguing
that general principles of statutory construction should be used to interpret severability);
Shumsky, supra note 15, at 272-75 (arguing for applying clear statement rule to question of
severability).
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To begin with, the displacement without inferred fallback law
approach is easy for the judiciary to implement in any specific case.
Take, for example, the question of what should happen to increased
hard-money contribution limits if an accompanying ban on softmoney contributions within the same statute is held unconstitutional.
Unless Congress explicitly provides in statutory text that the two
should stand or fall together, the displacement approach forbids a
court to do anything to the hard-money contribution limits. However,
if Congress does explicitly link the two provisions, then the inseverability clause linking them is enforceable just like any other law
(assuming it has no constitutional defects itself). Thus, if Congress did
include an inseverability clause, the unconstitutionality of the softmoney ban would result in the elimination of the increased hardmoney contribution limits as wen. 21 s
In addition to ease of implementation, the displacement without
inferred fallback law approach is generally consistent with past judicial practice. As set out in Part II, it is consistent with the original
approach to partial unconstitutionality. And while displacement
without inferred fallback law does break from the current excisionbased conception of judicial review, its impact on case outcomes
would not be significant in a quantitative sense. The only outcomes
that would change are those in which courts reached a holding of
inferred inseverability under the current excision-based approach.
Booker is the only Supreme Court decision in recent years in this category.219 The last Supreme Court holding of inferred inseverability of
a federal law prior to Booker was the 1982 decision in Northern
Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line. 220 And to find a Supreme Court
218 For an analysis of this specific issue that yields the same result as my analysis here,
but by different means, see Shumsky, supra note 15, at 228-31 (noting that Court would
look to legislative intent to determine severability of McCain-Feingold soft-money ban section from rest of campaign finance reform bill).
219 The Supreme Court applied a legislative intent test to hold an Executive Order
inseverable in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 190-94
(1999). The Court did not offer much reasoning to support its application of a legislative
intent approach to determining the severability of an Executive Order. See id. at 191
("Because no party before this Court challenges the applicability of [statutory severability]
standards, for purposes of this case we shall assume, arguendo, that the severability standard for statutes also applies to Executive Orders.").
220 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40 (1982). The Court stated:
We cannot conclude that, if Congress were aware that the grant of jurisdiction
could not constitutionally encompass this [state law contract claim] and similar
claims, it would simply remove the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over
these matters, leaving the jurisdictional provision and adjudicatory structure
intact with respect to other types of claims, and thus subject to Art. III constitutional challenge on a claim-by-claim basis.
Id.
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holding of inferred inseverability of a federal law prior to Northern
Pipeline, it is necessary to go all the way back to the New Deal. 221
Inference-based invalidation is similarly rare in state systems. 222
Many modern Supreme Court decisions holding federal laws partially unconstitutional are fully consistent with the displacement
without inferred fallback law approach. 223 Additionally, every
instance of as-applied adjudication to which the excision approach
attributes implicit severance analysis is consistent with the displacement without inferred fallback law approach.
There are a number of cases that use standard severability reasoning to reach outcomes consistent with my proposed displacement
approach. For this category of cases, shifting to the proposed displacement method would eliminate the case-by-case, provision-byprovision analysis that characterizes existing doctrine. If there were
reason to believe that the search for legislative intent outside of
explicit fallback law would actually prove fruitful in such cases, the
loss of accuracy would count against the displacement approach as a
cost of the change. But there is no persuasive reason to believe that
this is so. To the contrary, preference-driven manipulation of severability doctrine by the judiciary is an acknowledged problem. 224
221 See Nagle, supra note 15, at 220 ("The Supreme Court has not invalidated an entire
federal statute as nonseverable since the 1930s."). This statement excludes Northern
Pipeline, presumably because it treats the unit of analysis as the entire statute-in that
case, the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). The holding of inseverability in Northern Pipeline was of application
inseverability of a statutory provision, as in Booker. See id.
The last major burst of commentary and analysis surrounding severability doctrine
occurred in the wake of the Court's 1983 invalidation of the legislative veto in INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The circuits split on the severability of the legislative veto
contained in the Reorganization Act. Compare EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 973 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding legislative veto inseverable), with EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724
F.2d 1188, 1192 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding legislative veto provision severable), and Muller
Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380, 388 (6th Cir. 1984) (same). The Supreme Court held
the legislative veto severable in both cases that squarely addressed the question. See
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-35; Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 697 (1986).
222 I have not undertaken to quantify the decisions on a state-by-state basis, but state
severability regimes function much like the federal system: A strong presumption of severability can be overcome by judicially perceived legislative intent. See Dorf, supra note 26,
at 285 (describing state law as "remarkably uniform on questions of severability," with
each state's practice tracking presumption that statutes are severable "unless the party
claiming nonseverability can show that: (1) severance would leave an incoherent statute, or
(2) the legislature would not have enacted the statute without the invalid portion").
223 In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171 (1983), for example, the Court invalidated the statutes so far as they were unconstitutional, but no further. In both cases, the Court neither mentioned severance nor suggested
that its holding of partial unconstitutionality should occasion inseverability analysis.
224 See Stem, supra note 15, at 101-02 ("The only general conclusion which can be
drawn from ... [an] analysis of what the Supreme Court has both said and done ... is that
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Notwithstanding the relative infrequency of inferred inseverability, not all cases are of equal weight, and the inferred inseverability holdings tend to be heavies. Both Booker and Northern
Pipeline, for instance, required systemic changes in federal adjudication. Should the potential for disruption that comes from eliminating
inferred inseverability in these cases with systemic impacts count
against the proposed displacement approach? To the contrary: The
case for political branch involvement in restructuring is strongest in
precisely such consequential cases. And although there is nothing that,
in theory, forecloses legislative involvement after a holding of inseverability, the effect of such a decision, in practice, can be to take away
the perceived need for such involvement. 225
Requiring the legislature explicitly to provide for any fallback law
to take effect in the event of partial unconstitutionality not only provides a clear backdrop against which to legislate, but it also operates
as a preference-estimating default rule. Congress often includes severability clauses in legislation and only rarely includes inseverability
clauses, a pattern that "suggests that in the vast majority of cases,
Congress intends its statutes to be severable and that when it does not,
it says so." 226 This pattern also holds at the state level. In fact, many
states have enacted statutes that set a default rule of severability. 227
To all these benefits that would flow from a clear statement rule
requiring a deviation from severability within an excision-based
framework, the proposed displacement approach adds explanatory
simplicity and the avoidance of judicial lawmaking. The explanatory
simplicity runs along a few dimensions. First, the displacement
approach makes it unnecessary to attribute implied severance analysis
to all instances of as-applied adjudication and to all holdings of partial
unconstitutionality from which that explicit severance analysis is currently conspicuously absent (even though conceptually required
within the current excision-based framework).
the Court avails itself of one formula or another in order to justify results which seem to it
to be desirable for other reasons.").
225 In this respect, Booker and Northern Pipeline present a striking contrast. Whereas
the Court in Northern Pipeline used inseverability to goad congressional action by
expanding the consequences of the constitutional holding, the Court in Booker used a
combination of severability and inseverability holdings to render unnecessary the need for
congressional action. Cf N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88 ("This limited stay will afford Congress
an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of
adjudication ... .");Booker, 543 U.S. at 227 ("[T]wo provisions of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 (SRA) that have the effect of making the Guidelines mandatory must be invalidated in order to allow the statute to operate in a manner consistent with congressional
intent.").
226 Shumsky, supra note 15, at 276.
227 See Dorf, supra note 26, at 285-86 & 295 app.
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Second, displacement without inferred fallback law allows the
absence of law to be treated as such. Existing doctrine rests on the
mistaken presupposition that the question of fallback law for a partially unconstitutional statute is always within the statute's
"domain"-that is, that the statute supplies law for answering the
question posed of it.228 There is often no provision in a partially
unconstitutional statute directing what should be done in the case of
partial invalidity. By imposing an imaginative reconstruction approach
to statutory construction on every partially unconstitutional statute,
existing doctrine begs the antecedent question of whether statutory
construction is to be engaged in at all. In circumstances such as
Booker, in which a statute runs up against a constitutional problem
that could not have been anticipated at the time of enactment, it is
utterly fictional to treat the statute as if it contained an answer to the
question of what the fallback law should be. Such a fiction would be
easier to swallow if severability doctrine were inevitable-but it is not.
Third, the proposed displacement approach makes it unnecessary
to posit the existence of a "severance power" possessed by the judiciary.229 Michael Dorf has argued that, without severability, "any judicial decision finding any law unconstitutional, on its face or as applied,
would call into question the entire legal code." 230 A corollary is that
"a statute that has unconstitutional applications cannot be constitutionally applied to anyone, even to those whose conduct is not constitutionally privileged, unless the court can sever the unconstitutional
applications of the statute from the constitutionally permitted
ones." 231 Similarly, David Gans has written that "without some severance power, a court would have to invalidate a statute as a whole if
even one of the statute's clauses or provisions violated the
Constitution." 232 These statements make sense within an excisionbased framework for judicial review but not within the framework for
judicial review set forth in Marbury and in the federal and state case
law of the surrounding decades. Inseverability is itself an artifact of
modern severability doctrine, not a necessary feature of judicial
review. Because the proposed displacement approach does not
require positing a "severance power," it avoids the problems of
228 For criticism of this presumption, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50
U. Ctt1. L. REv. 533, 536 (1983) ("To find that there is 'law' on a given subject is to endow

the courts with authority they lacked before. It is therefore worthwhile to demand that,
before courts begin the process of 'construction,' they ascertain that the legislature has
conferred the power of interpretation.").
229 See Gans, supra note 55, at 653.
230 Dorf, supra note 8, at 370.
231 Dorf, supra note 26, at 238.
232 Gans, supra note 55, at 653.
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needing to explain and justify the courts' possession of such a power,
where it comes from, and how far it reaches.
The final advantage of displacement without inferred fallback law
is that it avoids the routine judicial lawmaking-by-subtraction that
excision requires. Within the excision approach, every holding of partial unconstitutionality requires a judicial operation beyond judicial
review itself to decide what to do with the constitutional remainder:
The court must either (i) make a new law consisting of the old law
minus its unconstitutional parts, or (ii) expand invalidity beyond
unconstitutionality. Within the proposed displacement approach, by
contrast, there is no need for a court to perform any operation on a
statute to prevent metastasis from partial unconstitutionality into total
invalidity. The only remaining issue after a holding of partial unconstitutionality is interpretive-what, if anything, did the legislature provide? A conception of constitutional adjudication that envisions the
Court making a "new law" consisting of the old law minus its unconstitutional parts whenever it uses severability doctrine to contain the
effects of a constitutional ruling assigns the judiciary an avowedly legislative function. The displacement approach, by contrast, cleanly
divides responsibility between the Court and Congress: The Court is
responsible for enforcing the Constitution, and Congress is responsible for legislating.
By authorizing the Court to devise a scheme approximating what
Congress would have wanted, even when the idea that Congress actually wanted anything is a fiction, existing severability doctrine leads to
law for which neither the Court nor Congress is entirely answerable.
For example, who is responsible for the federal sentencing scheme
that is now in place in the wake of the Booker decision? Not
Congress, which legislated a different system; not the Court, which
only ruled as it did because of what it concluded the enacting
Congress would have wanted. And while it is true that Congress can
step in at any time to change the current federal sentencing scheme,
any changes it wishes to make must pass through the demanding
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, § 7, while
the Court remains free to continue refining the federal sentencing
system without such constraints.
C.

Qualifications and Objections

Having set forth the displacement approach and described its
advantages, various qualifications and objections warrant consideration. An initial qualification relates to the ambition of the proposal.
Recovering the original approach to partial unconstitutionality shifts
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the understanding of judicial review in a manner that is ambitious in
one respect but modest in another. The shift from excision to displacement is ambitious inasmuch as displacement is a replacement for the
reigning general framework for judicial review. After such a shift,
every single instance of judicial review would be understood in terms
of displacement rather than excision. Notwithstanding the magnitude
of the conceptual shift, however, the impact on case outcomes would
be modest, as noted above.
A second qualification relates to the ease of implementing the
displacement approach as well as to its theoretical underpinnings. The
implementation of displacement without inferred fallback law would
be relatively simple within any given state system or the federal
system. Courts would simply stop engaging in the counterfactual speculation required by modern severability doctrine; it might even take a
while before anyone noticed any change. Matters become more complicated when considering the problem of partial unconstitutionality
across systems. Suppose inferred inseverability analysis were eliminated from federal law but not from a particular state's law. In such a
situation, may a federal court reviewing a partially unconstitutional
state statute use the proposed displacement approach if state law
mandates the use of inferred inseverability analysis? An absolute incapacity for such analysis in federal courts would result in the potential
for different outcomes depending on whether the same constitutional
challenge is litigated in state or federal court.
These considerations point to a significant limitation on the arguments for the proposed displacement approach. If the arguments
against inferring fallback law yielded the conclusion that such inference is categorically beyond the power of an Article III court-say,
because it calls for a task necessarily legislative rather than judicial in
nature-then federal courts could not engage in it at all. Yet the arguments need not be taken to establish such a sweeping proposition.
After all, federal courts have been inferring fallback law for almost a
century and a half. The arguments against such inference are better
understood as establishing a limit on the federal courts vis-a-vis
Congress with respect to the allocation of federal legislative power,
rather than a categorical absence of judicial authority to infer legislative intent more generally. At its core, the argument for displacement
without inferred fallback law rests on judgments about how best to
implement the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution.
To the extent that any given state seeks to mirror the federal division of separated powers, the arguments against inferred fallback law
carry over to that state system. But such mirroring is not
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mandatory,233 and federal courts facing partially unconstitutional state
statutes should respect state separation-of-powers schemes that
empower the state judiciary to infer fallback law. Formally, the exercise in which the federal court would be engaged is no different from
the state's highest-court-predictive approach required when facing any
other question of state substantive law. 234
Another qualification relates to situations in which displacement
alone does not appear to provide sufficient guidance about just what is
to be displaced. Consider, for instance, a state system for regulating
wine sales that discriminates against out-of-state wine shippers by permitting in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers, while requiring
that all other shippers must sell through in-state wholesalers, resulting
in higher costs. 235 Suppose that this discriminatory treatment with
respect to direct shipping is held to violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause because it discriminates against out-of-state wineries. 236 In the
absence of explicit guidance from the legislature, should the court
cure the discrimination by closing direct shipment to in-state shippers
or, instead, by opening direct shipment to out-of-state shippers?
Under current law, a court must discern unexpressed legislative
intent to determine the remedy that "best furthers the legislative purposes animating the underlying statutory scheme. " 237 If courts cannot
engage in that sort of hypothesizing about legislative intent regarding
fallback law-and they cannot under the proposed displacement
approach-then what should courts do in circumstances like these?
The short answer is that courts should look to constitutional law
rather than unexpressed legislative purpose in formulating a
remedy. 238
233 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1837 (2001) ("[F]unctions that seem intuitively nonjudicial in the federal system are assigned to the judicial branch in some states, and judicial
officers discharge them comfortably.").
234 Cf Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV.
L. REv. 2085, 2152 (2002) ("[S]tate statutes arrive in federal court hand in hand with their
own homegrown state interpretive methodology" because "legislating interpretive methodology is, within limits, an incident of the power to legislate.").
235 See Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that North Carolina's
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state wineries violates Commerce Clause).
236 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (holding that New York and Michigan's
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state wineries violates Commerce Clause).
237 Evan H. Caminker, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Under-Inclusive Statutes, 95
YALE L.J. 1185, 1185 (1986).
238 See id. at 1202-03 ("[R]ather than choose the remedy most consistent with policies
underlying the statutory scheme, courts should select the remedy that best promotes values
embedded in the constitutional text."); Gans, supra note 55, at 696 ("Severability should
not be treated as a legislative question to be answered by inspecting the intent of the
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Even if the Dormant Commerce Clause problem can be cured by
either the court's contraction or its expansion of the favored treatment, it does not follow that constitutional doctrine is or ought to be
indifferent between the two "remedial starting point[s]. " 239 Dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine implements a national-market norm that
supports an economic system in which "every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty ... that no
home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by
customs duties or regulations exclude them." 240 When the discriminatory wine-shipping scheme described above is held to violate this doctrine, courts should resort to the underlying national-market
constitutional norm in devising an appropriate remedy. Thus, the
court should order expansion of the direct-shipping benefit as a
"remedial starting point," 241 regardless of what the court believes the
legislature would have intended. If contraction of the benefit available
to in-state interests would not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause,
and if the legislature prefers that approach instead, it can so provide
by passing future legislation. But the court, charged with remedying
the constitutional violation resulting from the system that favors instate interests, should not try to divine the enacting legislature's
unenacted intentions. Instead, it ought to advance the underlying constitutional national-market norm with its remedy.
In addition to the foregoing qualifications, displacement without
inferred fallback law is subject to a number of potential objections
that must be considered. I address here two of the most prominent.
First, even if the historical analysis is persuasive in establishing
that the original approach to partial unconstitutionality had no need
for the hypothetical intent-based analysis required by modem severability doctrine, one could object that returning to a version of that
approach would be mistaken. The argument here is that severability at
some point became necessary as legislation became more complex.
One response to this critique is that even if legislation became more
complex throughout the nineteenth century, it is not as if legislation
was ever that simple. Another response is to question whether legislative intent-based excision analysis is the most appropriate response to
the increased statutory complexity that has occurred. The potential for
holdings of unconstitutionality to upset legislative bargains has been
present from the beginning of judicial review. If protecting implicit
enacting legislature. Instead, it is a remedial question for the courts to be considered in
light of structural constitutional principles, including separation of powers.").
239 Caminker, supra note 237, at 1201.
240 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
241 Caminker, supra note 237, at 1201.
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legislative bargains about partially unconstitutional statutes is the
province of the judicial department, why did it take five decades from
Marbury for a state court to develop a doctrine to serve that
function 242 and another two decades for the United States Supreme
Court to adopt it?243
A second objection to displacement without inferred fallback law
flips the historical perspective: If courts have been engaged in legislative intent-based excision analysis for a century and a half, can it any
longer be contended that such analysis is outside the judicial function?
This objection need not rest on a form of separation-of-powers
adverse possession. Professor Paul Bator was correct that the judicial
power is "a purposive institutional concept, whose content is a
product of history and custom distilled in the light of experience and
expediency." 244 With severability doctrine, however, experience has
revealed that expediency has too often overtaken history and custom.
The problem is not simply that the existing excision approach is
unmoored from traditional understandings of the federal judicial function and the Constitution's allocation of the legislative and judicial
powers, but that the modern approach is subject to manipulation.
Even those who accept the inevitability of severability should be
troubled by the manner in which the Supreme Court has wielded this
manipulable power to invalidate civil rights laws, 245 the federal
income tax, 246 and New Deal legislation, 247 among other statutes.
Should we make room in the "purposive institutional concept" of the
judicial power for this doctrine and the judicial role it both presupposes and perpetuates? Not when there is an alternative whose foundation in traditional understandings of the judicial function is as solid
as that of the proposed displacement approach.
See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("We are not able to reject a part
which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate
that which is unconstitutional, if there be any such, from that which is not."); see also
Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 89 (1877) ("Statutes that are constitutional in part only,
will be upheld so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution, provided the allowed
and prohibited parts are severable.").
244 Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article Ill, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990).
245 E.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883) (invalidating statute providing
remedy for abridgement of equal protection by private conspirators); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1875) (invalidating voter intimidation legislation).
246 E.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (invalidating
federal income tax scheme).
247 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 315-16 (1936) (invalidating statute
providing for regulatory oversight of coal industry); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S.
330, 360 (1935) (invalidating statute setting up compulsory retirement and pension system
for interstate railroad carriers).
242
243
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CONCLUSION

This Article's historical analysis of the first several decades of
post-Marbury judicial review in the United States clearly demonstrates that modern severability doctrine is not necessary for a workable system of judicial review. There is therefore no need for the
courts to continue the hypothetical mind-reading that modern severability doctrine requires. Courts should instead deploy a reconstructed
version of the displacement approach that operated before the advent
of modern severability doctrine. Depriving courts of the power to
reshape partially unconstitutional statutes to fit their perception of
what the legislature would have wanted better implements the
Constitution's separation of powers.
In the end, metaphors matter, and excision is pernicious. As a
description of what courts do to partially unconstitutional legislation,
the imagery of excision underwrites a conception of the judicial role
that is avowedly legislative. The acceptance of excision also effaces an
understanding of how courts can deal with partial unconstitutionality
in a manner properly judicial. Looking back to the original displacement approach to partial unconstitutionality points the way forward,
toward restoration of review without rewriting.
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